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I. INTRODUCTION

This article provides an initial examination of aspects of the relationship between
en banc sittings of the United States Courts of Appeals and the United States Supreme
*
Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University at Albany-SUNY. B.A., Antioch College, 1959; M.A.,
196 1, Ph.D., 1962 (political science), University of Oregon. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Arthur Hellman,
University of Pittsburgh Law School; Stefanie Lindquist, University of Georgia; and Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. An earlier version of this article was presented to the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31- September 3, 2000.
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Court, particularly the treatment the justices give to the courts of appeals en banc
decisions, compared to treatment given to courts of appeals' rulings by three-judge
panels. In part because justices have urged the courts of appeals to sit en banc more
often, cases from the courts of appeals decided by the Supreme Court during the 30year span from the Supreme Court's 1969 Term, the beginning of the Burger Court,
through O.T. 1998 are examined to answer whether en banc courts of appeals rulings
fare better at thejustices' hands, thus warranting the courts of appeals expenditure of
the effort to conduct the en banc procedure, or whether such en banc dispositions fare
worse.
Because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in particular has been urged to
increase its en banc rehearings, additional attention will be given to the Supreme
Court's treatment of en banc rulings from that court, as well as cases in which en banc
rehearing was denied with a published dissent, along with Ninth Circuitjudges' views
on the decision to hear cases en banc. 1
An extended time span was needed for this study, in order to avoid reaching
conclusions that might apply to a single decade but that might not be applicable over
a longer period, as turned out to be the case in this study. Selecting the Supreme
Court's 1969 Term as a starting point not only provided a thirty-year study period, but
that term also marked the beginning of Warren Burger's tenure as Chief Justice. Thus
during the period covered, there were only two Chief Justices, and the Court's
jurisprudence, although not immediately overturning the work of the Warren Court,
was generally conservative-indeed, increasingly so.
In addition to providing needed information about decisionmaking by the courts
of appeals, this article may provide insight into the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the lower courts and whether lower courtjudges act strategically, either with
respect to their court's resources or, more important, vis-a-vis the Supreme Court. This
is relevant to current discussion of how agents (court of appealsjudges) act in relation
to their principal (the Supreme Court).2 The picture provided may also assist lawyers
in deciding whether to seek rehearing en banc in cases decided against their clients, and
judges in deciding whether to grant these requests.
This article begins with a primer on en banc procedure, followed by a discussion
of why the U.S. Courts of Appeals sit en banc. Data on the Supreme Court's
disposition of en banc rulings is then presented, along with the justices' mention in
their opinions of those rulings and of dissents from denials of rehearing en banc. This
article then turns to a more detailed examination of some instances in which the
Supreme Court dealt with cases which the Ninth Circuit heard en banc. Finally, the

I.
There is some irony in talking about the Ninth Circuit's use of en bancs, because when its use was first
considered, the Ninth Circuit found no basis for having cases decided by panels of more than threejudges. Lang's Estate
v. C.I.R., 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938). The Third Circuit, however, held to the contrary in C.I.R. v. Textile Mills
SecuritiesCorp., 117 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1940) and was sustained by the Supreme Court in Textile Mills SecuritiesCorp.,
314 U.S. 326 (1941).
2.
For recent examples of the literature on this subject, see Donald R. Songer, et al., The HierarchyofJustice:
Testing a Principal-AgentModel ofSupreme Court-CircuitCourtInteractions,38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994), and,

with a focus on the Supreme Court's decisions to grant review, see Charles M. Cameron, et al., StrategicAuditing in
a PoliticalHierarchy:An InformationalModel of the Supreme Court's CertiorariDecisions,93 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
101 (2000).
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treatment the Supreme Court gave to en banc and panel rulings is compared, both for
all circuits and more specifically for cases from the Ninth Circuit.
II. A PRIMER ON EN BANC PROCEDURE
Before we proceed to discuss why courts of appeals sit en banc and then turn to the
core of the study, it might be useful to lay out the basic aspects of procedure with
respect to how courts of appeals sit en banc.3 Most people outside the courts probably
believe that en banc rehearings come only after a three-judge panel has ruled, and only
as a result of requests by lawyers for the party who has come out on the short end of
a decision. Petitions for rehearing en banc (PFREB), formerly called "suggestions" for
rehearing en banc, which accompany petitions for rehearing (PFR), prompt some en
banc rehearings. However, most en banc hearings result from actions by the courts'
own judges, that is, from sua sponte en banc calls.4
While most en banc calls occur only after a panel has filed its opinion, members
of a panel may call for an en banc hearing before they issue their disposition; 5 such
calls are often used to deal with intracircuit conflicts the panel has identified.6 Very
occasionally, two (or more) panels dealing with the same issue may seek an en banc
hearing on that common issue. In the situations just noted, there are instances when a
panel making a sua sponte en banc call may have circulated a proposed opinion, to
provide colleagues with a clear indication of what will be filed if the en banc hearing
is rejected, but this does not occur invariably.
When a panel has issued an opinion, any judge may initiate en banc activity. The
dissenting judge on a divided panel may call for en banc rehearing after filing the
dissent, or another member of the court (an "off-panel judge") may initiate the call,
perhaps relying on the panel dissenter's opinion. At least in the Ninth Circuit in recent
years, when the parties have not sought an en banc rehearing and an off-panel judge
makes an en banc call, the parties may then be asked to submit briefs on whether the

3. For another, brief description of the process, see Arthur D. Hellman, GettingIt Right: PanelErrorand the
En Banc Processin the Ninth CircuitCourtofAppeals, 34 U.C. DAVISL. REv. 425,435-36 (2000) [hereinafter Getting
It Right].
4.
Arthur Hellman notes that from 1994 through 1998, off-panel judges initiated en-banc related action before
the parties filed aPFREB. Id. at 443. And Judge Douglas Ginsburg notes that most cases reheard en banc in the District
of Columbia Circuit "were reheard at the instance of nonpanelists who were concerned about the proposed panel
decision." Douglas H. Ginsburg and Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990,59 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 1008, 101213 (1991) [hereinafter The Court En Banc].
5. Arthur Hellman notes "one of the mechanisms used by the Ninth Circuit today to maintain uniformity [is]
the sua sponte, panel-initiated en banc call." Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal
to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 377,388 (2000) (providing examples) [hereinafter The Unkindest
Cut]. For a complaint about en banc hearing before panel disposition, see Belk v.Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, where Judge Wilkinson writes, "The Fourth Circuit refers cases initially to three-judge panels for good
reason," continuing that "the potential for producing splintered decisions" in a court of nine or more members "is
magnified when there has been no prior panel consideration of acase" so that the panel could perform its "winnowing
function" before the court of appeals heard the case. 211 F.3d 853, 854-55 (4th Cir. 2000) (Wilkinson, J., concurring
in denial of initial hearing en banc).
6. Getting It Right, supranote 3, at 455 n. 104. As Hellman noted elsewhere, "Under the existing arrangement,
Ninth Circuitjudges can and do grant rehearing en banc to resolve tensions in circuit law caused by inconsistencies in
doctrines or outcomes less blatant than explicit rejection." The Unkindest Cut, supra note 5, at 386. See The Unkindest
Cut, supra note 5, at 387 for examples.
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case should be reheard en banc, thus reversing the expected order of events in which
a party request is followed by judicial action.7
An en banc call may not be an off-panel judge's first action after a panel
disposition. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, off-panel judges "stop the clock," that
is, they seek to suspend the time by which en banc rehearing must be sought, while
they raise questions with the panel and seek to persuade it to alter the result reached or
to amend its opinion. They may do this while a party's petition for rehearing is
pending, putting party request and sua sponte judicial behavior on parallel tracks, or
without the party having filed a petition.8 At times, a colleague's urging will lead the
panel to amend its opinion, 9 but when the panel declines to do so or their colleague is
not satisfied by the changes, the "stop clock" may be followed by an en banc call. At
other times, the off-paneijudge proceeds immediately to an en banc call without first
stopping the clock.' 0
Once the en banc call is made and the initiating judge has circulated a supporting
memo, the panel (or, if it was divided, the panel majority) will circulate a response. At
that point, otherjudges of the court may join the fray by circulating memos until the
date set for voting on whether to take the case en banc.
For an en banc hearing to take place, a majority of the court is required. Some
courts require an absolute majority of the active-duty members of the court, while
others require only a majority of non-recused active judges. While senior circuit judges
are not allowed to vote on whether to rehear a case en banc, in most circuits they are
allowed to elect to participate in the en banc court if they have served on the panel in
the case being reheard. In the Ninth Circuit, which uses a limited en banc court of only
eleven judges (the chief judge and ten others, drawn by lot), " a senior judge who has
been a member of the panel in
the case may elect to be placed in the pool from which
12
the en banc court is drawn.

7.
An instance, noted by another circuit, in which the Ninth Circuit inquired whether the parties wished a case
reheard en banc even though the losing party had not sought en bane rehearing was Cheeley v. UnitedStates, 21 F.3d
914(9th Cir. 1994), modified 36 F.3d 1439(9th Cir. 1994). See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667,681 n. 15(4th
Cir. 1999).

8.
When, after an off-panel judge has questioned the panel's disposition, the party does not file a PFREB, that
judge "often did not pursue the cases." Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 443.
9.

A number of the amended opinions in the FederalReporterare a result of this process, although the panel

seldom indicates why it is amending.
10.

A senior circuit judge may stop the clock or may call for en banc rehearing, but, as described supra, may

not vote. In responding to a PFREB, seniorjudges-like a districtjudge on a panel-are recorded as "recommending"
that the petition be accepted or rejected.
It. A judge not drawn by lot for three successive en bancs is automatically placed on the next en banc court.
Lots are used because if seniority were used, the en banc judges would be disproportionately those appointed by the
president of one party. The Ninth Circuit does have a provision for an en bane sitting of the full court-now twenty-eight
active-duty positions-but such an en bane rehearing has been sought only rarely and none has ever taken place.

12.

For differences in procedures among the U.S. Courts of Appeals, see JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., CASE

MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2000).

A district judge or a visiting judge from anothercircuit who sits with the panel is not eligible to participate in the
en banc court. When slippage occurred in a case that came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger noted it but
did not act upon it. "This case was originally argued before a panel consisting of two Circuit Judges and one District
Judge sitting by designation.... The District Judge sat with the Court of Appeals en bane. This point was not raised in

the question presented in the petition for certiorari but the Solicitor General, in a footnote, called attention to the District
Judge's participation. He expressed the view that, although 28 U.S.C. 46(c) limits en bane hearings to circuit judges in
active service (and any retired circuitjudge who participated in the initial hearing), the error was harmless." The Chief
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If en banc rehearing is denied, some of thejudges who have sought that rehearing
may file a dissent for publication. Just as not all justices who vote to grant certiorari
dissent from the denial of certiorari petitions, with few now doing so, not all courts of
appeals judges voting for en banc rehearing issue a public dissent if the en banc call
fails. Published dissents are issued in only a small proportion of cases where en banc
rehearing was considered, and when a dissent is published, often it isjoined by fewer
than all judges who supported en banc rehearing. 3
A decision to take a case en banc usually results in the panel disposition being
vacated; in some circuits, this is automatic, while in others, the decision is made on a
case-by-case basis. Once the decision to rehear (or hear) a case en banc is made, the
parties will be asked to file briefs. However, there are some instances in which the
judges consider additional rebriefing at the en banc stage unnecessary, either because
the issues to be considered there were explored adequately in the briefs submitted to
the panel or because the matter was sufficiently ventilated in the exchanges among the
judges leading to the vote to take the case en banc. At times, perhaps because of lessthan-adequate initial briefing, the judges do not believe that additional briefing will aid
them or they feel that the lawyers do not adequately understand the reasons behind the
court's decisions to proceed en banc, which is often different from straightforward
presentation of the issues that brought the parties to court.' 4 For similar reasons, in
some instances en banc courts dispense with oral argument, although they usually do
hear it.15 After briefs are submitted and argument is held, the judges confer, as they
would concerning any case; an assignment of the opinion is made; and opinions are
drafted and circulated within the en banc court until, in due course, they are ready for
filing. 16 Because of their geographic dispersal, to hold an en banc court the judges of
a court have to make a separate trip to hold a special sitting, unlike the judges of the
District of Columbia Circuit, all of whom have their regular "duty stations" in the same
courthouse.
Some courts of appeals (not including the Ninth Circuit) also have informal en
banc procedures, in which, before filing an opinion, a panel circulates it to all the other
judges; in some circuits, this is done in particular categories of cases specified by court
rule. This practice allows otherjudges to raise questions about the opinion or to call for
en banc rehearing before release of the panel disposition. Use of such a procedure
makes formal en banc proceedings less necessary, as many matters that might have

Justice then avoided dealing further with the matter by saying, "In these circumstances, we need not reach the question."
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 n.4 (1974).
13. This observation is based on examination of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case files.
14. An example of a case both heard en banc before a final panel disposition and decided en banc without
additional argument at the en banc stage is Richardson v.United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3rd Cir. 1972). There, as Chief
Justice Burger noted in his opinion reversing, the case was first argued to a panel, but "After asecond round ofbriefs,
the Court of Appeals determined sua sponte to hear the case en banc without further argument." United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169 n.3 (1974).
15. Because of the large number of judges a lawyer has to face, one Ninth Circuit chief judge allowed no
questions of counsel until five minutes had transpired. This permitted the lawyer at least that long to make an
uninterrupted presentation, aluxury otherwise not available-and certainly not available in oral argument before the
United States Supreme Court.
16. At least in the Ninth Circuit, when the en banc court is divided, preparation of a dissenting opinion is also
assigned rather than allowed to bubble up among the dissenters, although judges other than the assigned dissenter may
file separate dissenting opinions, just as members of the majority may file concurring opinions.
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required an en banc sitting will be resolved informally, perhaps through alterations of
the opinion. Although it occurs before any opinion is filed, this is like the process by
which amended opinions often occur as a result ofjudges' informal, behind-the-scenes
action. When courts of appeals were smaller before their expansion from the 1978
Judgeship Act, all judges could more easily review all to-be-published cases in their
courts and informal en bancs could operate more easily, decreasing the necessity of the
court having to sit en banc formally.
Use of informal en banc procedures implicates the court of appeals-Supreme
Court relationship. This is true not only when a footnote to a panel opinion indicates
to the justices, as well as to other readers, that a full court has examined the opinion.
It also applies specifically when the case before the court of appeals panel involves an
issue in which the Supreme Court, in a case from another circuit, has overturned circuit
precedent the panel would otherwise have been expected to apply. Here the question
is whether the court of appeals must go en banc, perhaps without oral argument, to
change its own law, which has been trumped by the Supreme Court, or whether the
panel could recognize the obvious and make clear the effect on circuit law of the
intervening Supreme Court ruling. When the Supreme Court's action has come in a
case from another circuit, the need for some type of action involving judges outside the
panel is greater, but when the new Supreme Court development takes place in a case
from the very circuit which now has to decide how to proceed on remand, the panel
which has handled the case can more easily recognize the inevitable effect on circuit
law without the need for en banc activity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit makes particular use of procedures short of an official en banc
sitting-perhaps we should call it a "quasi-en banc procedure"-in this situation. A
panel recognizing that the Supreme Court's action has superceded circuit precedent can
circulate its disposition to the whole court, and if the court agrees, a so-called "Irons
footnote" is added indicating the full court's agreement to overturn circuit precedent. 7
When a court of appeals has a procedure for pre-filing circulation of opinions to
the full court, alljudges are expected to monitor their colleagues' work. Without such
a mechanism, monitoring of panel dispositions devolves informally on less than the full
court. While all judges have the opportunity to examine the opinions and to "stop the
clock" or call for an en banc, participation in such activity is a voluntary matter. It thus
varies, with somejudges far more actively involved than others, who can remain "free
riders" leaving the monitoring work to their more involved colleagues.' 8 Ajudge who
knows that a certain colleague is making en banc calls can engage in less monitoring,
at least if he or she shares the colleague's general outlook; it is enough to wait until the

17.

The "Irons footnote" is based on Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 168 n.I I (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a

discussion of the procedure, see The Court En Banc, supra note 4, at 1015-16. For a dispute over the use of a such a
footnote, see In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128, 144, 145-146(1999) (en banc) (Edwards, J., concurring)

(saying that court's policy "allows-but expressly does not require-three judge panels to conclude that it would be
economical to attempt to secure unanimous full-court consent before deciding that a circuit precedent is no longer good
law"); (Henderson, J., concurring) (asserting the panel should have circulated the opinion to full court, which would not
have endorsed it).
18. Hellman observes that "the evidence leaves no doubt that the judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
engage in a substantial amount of opinion monitoring." The Unkindest Cut, supra note 5, at 395. The sufficiency of
monitoring by the Ninth Circuit's judges is the focus of Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 436-38.
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"caller" has stopped the clock or called for an en banc before paying closer attention
to the case and entering the discussion.
III. WHY SIT EN BANC?
The courts of appeals sit en banc for a number of reasons. One study has shown
that the principal factors that explain which panel rulings will receive en banc rehearing
are a panel's overturning a decision by a lower court or agency, a panel member's
filing a dissent, and a panel ruling that runs in a liberal direction.' 9 Other factors
include the correctness of the panel's ruling, a factor that may or may not be related to
the legal correctness of the panel's ruling; justice based on the specifics of the case,
which may or may not be related to the legal correctness of the panel's ruling; and the
importance of the case to the parties as well as for the law. Discussing theories of the
relationship between a panel and the court of appeals of which it is a part, Judge
Douglas Ginsburg says that if the panel is the court's agent, the court as a whole retains
responsibility for the correct result in the case. However, if the panel is the court, en
banc rehearing can only legitimately occur "to prevent the panel decision from binding
subsequent, otherwise autonomous panels to an erroneous rule of law."' 20 This
"virtually eliminat[es] justice in the individual case, and the importance of the case to
the parties," as en banc criteria. 2'
Whatever the reasons the judges may proffer (see below), the most likely actual
reason is that a majority of judges do not like the panel's ruling.2 Justice Scalia
expressed such a position to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Court of Appeals (the White Commission), when he argued that en banc review was
intended "to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly wrong. 23 In their
published dissents from denials of en banc rehearings,judges speak most often to the
substance of the panel's ruling, arguing that, for one or another reason, the panel erred.
Arthur Hellman indicates that this occurs both concerning panel rulings that favor
individual rights and those that favor the government, 24 the latter being significant
because of the perception that the Ninth Circuit is excessively liberal.
The converse of seeking en banc rehearing to correct panel error would be voting
not to rehear cases en banc because the judges agree with the result. However, that is
only part of the reason, as judges do not call for en banc rehearing each and every time

19. Tracey E. George, The Dynamicsand Determinantsofthe Decisionto GrantEn BancReview, 74 WASH.
L. REV. 213,220 (1999). For an examination of the effect of ideology (clearly related to perceptions of whether the panel
"got it right") on whether a court sits en banc and reverses the panel, see Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of
Appeals: The Effect ofIdeology on En Banc Rehearings,2 J. OF APP. PRAC. AND PROCESS 157 (2000) (examining the
Fourth Circuit).
20. The Court En Banc, supra, note 4, at 1011.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1032. Judge Ginsburg commented, "[l1f a majority do believe that the panel almost surely has
erred, then that is properly reason enough to trigger en bane review."
23. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Byron White (Aug. 21, 1998) (Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals). Hellman also found that judges' memoranda supporting en banc
rehearing of a case with a panel opinion "almost invariably argue that the panel opinion is erroneous," whatever else
they may assert. Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 455 n. 104.
24. Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 449.
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they disagree with the result a panel reaches. Some judges may not care about the
panel's ruling one way or the other; that is, rulings can be said to fall within their "zone
of indifference. 25 Others may disagree with the panel's ruling but not "have much
passion in the matter," as when "they believe that the panel opinion, although perhaps
erroneous, is not important enough to warrant correction. 2 6
There are other reasons why judges, even if they are displeased with particular
panel outcomes, do not vote to rehear all such cases en banc. As Hellman has observed,
"the fact that the panel's result would not prevail in the full court does not necessarily
mean that the case will go en banc, '7 and he quotes former Chief Judge Patricia Wald
of the District of Columbia Circuit as saying, "There may... be pragmatic reasons
why an obviously frustrated judge will not follow the en banc route., 28 Among those
"pragmatic reasons" are institutional concerns, which play a large role in the judges'
considerations. En bancs require a significant expenditure of judicial resources,
including time to prepare for argument, argument itself and the conference following,
and preparation and circulation of opinions.
In discussing the considerable costs to a court of appeals in holding an en banc
rehearing, Judge Ginsburg notes that even panelists who also serve on the en banc
court "may need substantially to repeat their preparation" because of the lapse of time
since initial panel consideration, and "they may have to start almost from scratch if the
parties have submitted new briefs for the rehearing," particularly if the en banc court
is to consider matters not before the panel.2 9 Moreover, although the author of the
opinion for the en banc court may be able to draw on the prior panel ruling, or on the
opinion of a panel dissenter, even more time may be consumed in opinion-preparation
for an en banc decision because the draft disposition must be circulated to morejudges,
each of whom may wish to contribute, so that "[a]t each step the opinion writer must
accommodate multiple, sometimes conflicting, suggestions." 3 Judges might believe
that it is not worth the court's time and energy to rehear the case, because of the
required additional in-chambers work necessary to decide the case and the possible
disruption of calendars caused by having to bring togetherjudges who live scattered
throughout the circuit, although en banc courts can be held when thejudges gather for
their periodic (administrative) court meetings. Beyond these costs, there is the
possibility that the court has done all that work only to come out at the same place as
the panel, or the process "may yield a decision that.., has little implication beyond the
facts of the case being reheard."'"
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) embodies three
desiderata for rehearing en banc: conflict with circuit precedent, which includes the
desire to overrule an old precedent, or to resolve intracircuit conflict; conflict with

25.

Id. at 454.

26.

Id.

27. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and FederalAppellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029,
1049 (1999) (quoting Patricia Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 482 (1985-86)).
28.
id.
29. The Court En Banc, supra note 4, at 1018.

30.
31.

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
Supreme Court rulings; and the presence of an issue of "exceptional importance."
These desiderata are taken seriously, but they are ambiguous: What is "exceptional
importance"?32 When is the lower court in conflict with the Supreme Court? This
ambiguity makes them malleable and thus useful tools asjudges seek to have a panel's
disposition reheard. Because only an en banc court may overturn the law of the circuit,
which is established by the first panel to decide an issue, the first consideration leads
courts of appeals to sit en banc to resolve tension between competing rules, or lines of
precedent, within the circuit-what is sometimes called intracircuit conflict 3 3-and to
overrule past decisions of the court. An indication of a panel request for en banc in
such circumstances can be seen in Justice Marshall's recitation of action in a Second
Circuit case. That court "heard the case en banc after a panel of three judges
determined it was inclined to overrule the case on which the District Court had placed
almost exclusive reliance. 34
As to FRAP 35's second consideration, possible conflict between a circuit ruling
and the Supreme Court, judges seeking en banc hearing often claim that a panel has
ignored the high court's rulings or failed to follow its dictates. In a particularly strong
statement in a case on government aid to parochial schools, Judge Reinhardt said that
a divided Ninth Circuit panel had "ignore[d] the clear dictates of the United States
Supreme Court as set forth in two major cases" and claimed that the failure to rehear
en banc meant that "we appear to endorse the panel's refusal to follow Supreme Court
precedent and to signal to other panels that they too may ignore the binding effect of
Supreme Court cases whenever they believe that the law should be different., 35 He
continued with a theme used by dissenters in other cases-that the courts of appeals
should follow the Supreme Court until the justices have changed the law, rather than
altering it before Supreme Court action. Thus, he said, if the wall of separation were
to be dismantled, "it will be when the Supreme Court decides to tear the wall down, not
when a panel of this court opts to begin the task." Given the Supreme Court's holding
on the subject, or what the dissenters claimed it to be, "Our duty is to follow that
holding.

36

Likewise, Judge Rymer wrote for six otherjudges with respect to civil forfeitures,
"Ifthe Supreme Court has changed its mind.., it is up to that Court to say So."' 37 In a
similar argument, when a panel upheld California's anti-affirmative action initiative,
Judge Hawkins asserted that, whatever the panel's prediction of how the current
32. And if one could agree that a case was of "exceptional importance," is that reason enough to hear acase en
banc? "Even if a panel decision resolves an issue of exceptional importance ....it may not be an economical use of the
court's time to rehear the case if a majority of the judges do not believe that the panel erred." Id. at 1032.
33. Hellman observes that "Ninth Circuit judges can and do grant rehearing en banc to resolve tensions in circuit
law caused by inconsistencies in doctrines or outcomes less blatant than explicit rejection." The Unkindest Cut, supra
note 5,at 386.
34. Caplin v. Marine Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416,417 n. 1(1972). Also interesting about this case
is that while Justice Marshall recited the position ofthe twojudges who had dissented from the en banc disposition and
the majority's response to them, he noted, "We do not intend to become enmeshed in the controversy and merely
indicate its existence." Id. at 421 n. 13.
35. Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch.Dist., 62 F.3d 300,301 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
36. Id. at 304.
37. United States v. $405,089.23,56 F.3d 41,43(9thCir. 1995) (Rymer, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
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justices would rule, a certain line of Supreme Court cases remained in effect, and thus
the latter, not the former, should govern: "The Supreme Court may well tell us that this
case is not governed by that line of authority or that an exception to the application of
those cases should be made for this particular measure. Until that happens, it is our not
our role to predict-however accurate our predictions might turn out to be."38
Another dissent from denial of rehearing en banc made a direct connection
between a panel's alleged failure to follow Supreme Court doctrine and the difficulties
created by en banc rehearings.39 The panel's opinion, wrote Judge Kozinski, was
"markedly out of step with the law of the Supreme Court and this circuit governing
these sensitive and important issues."4 ° In his view, "While en banc procedures are
cumbersome and time consuming, such considerations ought not deter us from
maintaining uniformity in the law of the circuit, as well as correcting an obvious
miscarriage of justice.'
Views about keeping Ninth Circuit law consonant with the Supreme Court's
position were also reflected in an argument againstrehearing en banc that was based
on the futility of obtaining a change in the Supreme Court's position. Explaining a vote
against rehearing en banc a Federal Tort Claims Act suit by the estate of a man killed
in a car accident involving an off-duty soldier, where the panel had affirmed dismissal
of the case against the Army, ajudge, explaining a vote against en banc rehearing, said
that, while sympathetic to the views expressed by the judge who sought the en banc
rehearing, "I have learned the hard way about the Supreme Court's application of the
Feres doctrine.' 42
Another reason judges offer for sitting en banc is that the rule pronounced by a
panel creates an intercircuit conflict. En banc rehearing is thought necessary before a
court adopts a position which creates such a conflict because of the importance of
maintaining national uniformity of law. Thus, at least for some judges, intercircuit
conflicts are sufficiently important to make a case causing one to be "en banc-worthy."
Even the possibility of an intercircuit conflict has been used to argue that the court
should go en banc. This reason for rehearing a case en banc is a potent weapon for a
judge, because it is tied to a court of appeals' relations with the Supreme Court.
Because presence of an intercircuit conflict is an important criterion for the Supreme
Court's selection of cases, if a court of appeals creates an intercircuit conflict orjoins
a preexisting intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari.
If no intercircuit conflict exists but a panel's disposition would appear to create one,

38. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,718 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hawkins, J., comment on denial
of rehearing en banc).
39. McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578,579 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
40. Id. at 579.
41. Id.
42. Unattributed quotations are taken from internal court communications to which the author was allowed
access.
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taking the case en banc might resolve the matter without creating the conflict, thus
reducing the probability that the Supreme Court would grant review.43
In an interesting and relevant twist, the Ninth Circuit sat en banc to render a
disposition after the Supreme Court had called attention to, but not decided, an aspect
of the case touching on an intercircuit conflict. United States v.Jose44 had reversed and
remanded a Ninth Circuit panel's decision on whether a district judge's conditional
enforcement of a subpoena was an appealable "final order. 4 5 In its per curiam opinion,
the justices had added, "We express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute.
The matter, indeed, is one that implicates an intercircuit conflict., 46 On remand, Judge
Hall, noting this language, wrote, "In light of this intercircuit conflict, we decided sua
sponte to consider the merits of this case en banc. 47
The version of Rule 35 in effect since December 1, 1998 "has incorporated
intercircuit conflict as an example of a matter that may be of exceptional importance
and therefore grounds for rehearing en banc. ' 48 Before that, this view was embodied
in the rules of several circuits (the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, as well
as the Ninth Circuit) that among the bases for taking a case en banc was an intercircuit
conflict regarding a rule of national application. While the rule in the Ninth Circuit
"provided for possible en banc rehearing if the intercircuit conflict substantially
affected a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for national
uniformity," intercircuit conflicts were grist for en banc rehearing in other courts of
appeals, which "may have determined that persistent and disruptive intercircuit
conflicts met the 'exceptional importance' standard for rehearing en banc under
[FRAP] 35.''49

In the Ninth Circuit, dissenters from the court's refusal to hear a case en banc have
called particular attention to intercircuit conflicts.5 ° An instance is Judge Kozinski's

43. Examples ofcases in which the Supreme Court, resolving an intercircuit conflict, ruled against the position
by the Ninth Circuit sitting in an en banc are Ardestani v. LN.S., 502 U.S. 129 (1991) (administrative deportation
hearings not "adversary adjudications" for which sovereign immunity is waived for purposes of the Equal Access to
Justice Act), where the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, with which five other courts of appeals agreed but the Ninth
Circuit took a different position, and Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (affirmative act of inducement by
public official not an element of the offense ofextortion "under color of official right" under the Hobbs Act), where the
Supreme Court, this time affirming the Eleventh Circuit, noted that its position "is consistent with holdings in eight other
Circuits," but that two circuits, one of which was the Ninth, held to the contrary. Id. at 258-59.
A more complete study of the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and courts of appeals' en banc rulings
would examine whether, in cases the justices take to resolve intercircuit conflicts, any of the "conflicting" cases other
than the one directly taken for review was decided en banc. Marybeth Herald notes, concerning O.T. 1996, "In one case
involving a circuit split in which the Supreme Court took another circuit's case on certiorari, the Supreme Court
implicitly reversed another Ninth Circuit en banc opinion." Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit,and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 477 (1998) [hereinafter Herald].
44. 519 U.S. 54 (1996).
45. Id. at 56.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). On the merits, the en banc Ninth
Circuit decided to agree with the court of appeals ruling with which it had earlier disagreed.
48. MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 12, at 22.
49. Id. at 22 n. 12.
50. For a more complete discussion, see generally Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of
Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REv. 119 (2002), originally a paper presented to Midwest Political Science Association in April
2000, from which the immediately following material draws.
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comment that the court's ruling in United States v. Phelps, 1 in addition to being
"factually incorrect, statutorily indefensible, and socially unwise," also "places us
squarely in conflict with our sister circuits, as the panel repeatedly embraces arguments
that have been rejected
by every other federal court of appeals that has had occasion
5' 2
to consider them.
Just as the absence of an intercircuit conflict has likewise been proffered as a basis
for not hearing a case en banc,53 it has also been argued that the court need not create
an intercircuit conflict by going en banc. In an extended debate on whether to rehear
a case en banc, ajudge who opposed en banc rehearing noted existing dissents in more
than one circuit and observed, "I don't think much would be added to the debate by
generating a circuit conflict." Anotherjudge responded by saying that to take the case
en banc would "run the risk that the en banc panel will ultimately agree" with his
dissent and that of an Eighth Circuit judge, "thereby creating a conflict in the circuits,"
but, asserted the judge, "that is not a sin."54
Some Ninth Circuit judges, believing strongly that the presence of intercircuit
conflict is reason for an en banc rehearing, have sought to mandate it in those
circumstances. One of Chief Justice Burger's "pet projects" was said to have been
having the courts of appeals sit en banc if the case implicated an intercircuit conflict.
This view was echoed by a Ninth Circuit judge calling for en banc rehearing "in the
hopes of sparing the Supreme Court some unnecessary work by resolving the conflict
with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits" and in the observation that "[g]reater use of en banc
procedures might help where there is a circuit split and the Ninth Circuit is forging its
own path. 55 Judge (later Chief Judge) J. Clifford Wallace was said to have been like
Chief Justice Burger in wanting a rule that the court must go en banc if an intercircuit
conflict was likely. The court declined to adopt such a rule, but it did have a rule that
a panel creating an intercircuit conflict should notify the remainder of the court to that
effect. Under this regimen, in one case when a government petition for rehearing
alleged an intercircuit conflict, Judge Wallace wrote to his colleagues, "Our General
Orders indicate that if the suggestion contains as one of its grounds the allegation that
the opinion initiates a conflict with another court of appeals, the panel is to advise us,"
so that "It is incumbent upon the panel to advise the court of this alleged conflict."
The need for such notification is eliminated by a mechanism proposed by the
court's Evaluation Committee and adopted by the court.56 The court's Case
Management Attorneys monitor several categories of the court's opinions prior to their
publication. One category is cases in which the opinion expressly rejects out-of-circuit
precedent. Finding such a case, the court attorneys refer it to one of the circuitjudges

51. 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. 895 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
53. Judge Kleinfeld observed, in a rare concurrence from a rejection of a denial ofrehearing en banc, that factors
probably explaining that decision included that the ruling "was compelled by well-established precedent" and that there
was "no inter- or intra-circuit conflict." Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 E3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998) (on
denial of rehearing en banc).
54. The judge cited a Ninth Circuit case, Paulsen v.C.IR., 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), which he said had
created an intercircuit conflict but which "was affirmed by the Supreme Court on a 7-2 vote. 105 S.Ct. 627 (1985)."
55. Herald, supra note 43, at411.
56. For a discussion of the work of the Evaluation Committee, see Judge David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Evaluation Committee, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 365 (2000).
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on the Evaluation Committee. If a petition for rehearing en banc (PFREB) is filed in
the case, that judge reviews the opinion and the PFREB to determine whether there is
an asserted conflict and whether the claim has merit. If so, the entire court is notified
about the opinion, making it unnecessary for the panel to do so. This process also
decreases the need for the judges to monitor their colleagues, at least as to intercircuit
conflicts and other categories of cases that the Case Management Attorneys are
expected to monitor.
More than one of these reasons is likely to appear in a judge's call for rehearing
a case en banc or in a dissent from the court's refusal to do so. Such multiple reasons
are likely because, unlike a certiorari court, which can limit its consideration to a few
designated issues, a mandatory jurisdiction court like the U.S. Courts of Appeals is
expected to reach most of the issues presented to it, although canons of judicial
restraint may allow it to avoid reaching some issues. Not only may different elements
be combined, but they may be interwoven, for example, when an intercircuit conflict
is said to be mirrored by intracircuit divisions.
Such a combination of elements is evident in one judge's complaint that the
panel's ruling "contradicts the plain language of the [statute], conflicts with a prior
decision of this circuit, and creates a needless intercircuit conflict with all courts of
appeals that have addressed the issue," and in another's dissent that alleged creation
of an intercircuit conflict, contravention of a Supreme Court decision, and creation of
a conflict within the circuit's own law.58 These assertions came in published dissents,
but the combination of claims can also be found in argument within the court, as when
a Ninth Circuitjudge stopped the clock in a labor election case "because the opinion
is arguably in conflict with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent," with
intercircuit matters also implicated because an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling used by the
panel had drawn on a Fifth Circuit case.
A. Going to the Supreme Court
In addition to dislike of panel rulings and the considerations in FRAP 35, another
reason why courts of appeals might rehear a case en banc is that it may be heading for
the Supreme Court. From time to time, justices have suggested that courts of appeals
sit en banc in matters likely to reach them,59 although whether informal en banc
proceedings of the sort discussed above would be satisfactory to thosejustices is not
known.
Justice O'Connor, circuit justice for the Ninth Circuit, has made that suggestion
several times at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 60 and also did so in her letter to

57. See In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J.).
58. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 74 F.3d 945,948 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). The panel disposition is at 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
59. It is not clear how long after the Congress provided for en banc sittings of the courts of appeals that justices
began to urge that en banc rehearing be used more frequently.
60. One ofthose instances was the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference at Portland, Oregon, August 17-19, 1997.
One judge observed, "Justice O'Connor first made the remark about the Ninth Circuit not going en banc often enough
at the 1996 Judicial Conference (Sun Valley) and then repeated it at the 1997 Conference (Portland)."
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the White Commission.6' Justice Kennedy, himself a former member of the Ninth
Circuit, also "has repeatedly suggested that [the Ninth Circuit] hear more cases en
banc, 62 and like Justice O'Connor, so suggested to the White Commission.63 Albeit
less directly, he made a comparable suggestion in an opinion, saying in dissent that a
Supreme Court summary reversal could be justified "based on such factors as ...the
conflict the Ninth Circuit created, without considering en banc its departure from the
rule followed in all other Circuits. ' ' Another oblique but nonetheless clear comment
on the Ninth Circuit came in the same Term, when a per curiam majority, reversing the
Ninth Circuit observed, "The ruling of the Court of Appeals, not reviewed en banc,
introduced uncertainty into routine proceedings of the many state courts within the

Court of Appeals' large geographic jurisdiction.

'65 Responding

to these suggestions,

the Ninth Circuit in fact sat en banc more frequently in recent years. While the court
took only 8 cases en banc each year in 1994 and 1995, it took 14 cases in 1996, 19 in
1997, 17 in 1998, and 20 in 1999-a distinct increase.66
1. Help for the Supreme Court
Why would having the courts of appeals sit en banc be helpful to the Supreme
Court? For cases in which the justices would be likely to be asked to consider a panel's
ruling, an en banc hearing might resolve the case and make Supreme Court review
unnecessary. This would be particularly so if the courts of appeals were to use "its own
en banc process to bring itsjurisprudence closer to the views of the Supreme Court. 67
This rationale can be seen in the argument by some Ninth Circuitjudges that the court
should hear a case en banc for reasons of "practicality-saving the Supreme Court the

61. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Byron R. White (June 23, 1998) (Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals). That Justice O'Connor would in fact give greater attention
to cases in which the courts of appeals had sat en banc can be seen in her dissent to the denial of certiorari in Northwest
Airlines Inc. v.Duncan, 531 U.S. 1058 (2000). There, in arguing that the Supreme Court should have taken the case to
resolve a situation in which courts of appeals had "taken directly conflicting positions" on a question of statutory
interpretation, after noting that "The legal issue is an important one, well suited for resolution by this Court," she
observed, "The two leading cases, Charas [v. TWA, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998)] and Hodges [v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995)], are both the product of en bane consideration. They have fully explored the relevant
considerations, including the language and history of the ADA [Airline Deregulation Act] and its pre-emption clause,
as well as the policies supporting the possible interpretations of the term 'service."' Id.
62. Stephen Reinhardt, TheAnatomy ofan Execution: Fairness v. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313,329 n.86
(1999).
63. 'The Ninth Circuit does not come close to the number ofen banc hearings necessary to resolve intra-circuit
conflicts, much less to address questions 'of exceptional importance."' Letter from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
to Justice Byron R. White (Aug. 17, 1998) (Commission on Structural Alternatives forthe Federal Courts of Appeals).
64. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 170 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 991 (1997).
66. See Thompson, supra note 56, at 368. The court also endorsed S. 1043, "The Ninth Circuit En Banc
Procedures Act" introduced by Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) in the 107th Congress. That bill, which provided that a
vote ofonly forty percent of the activejudges was needed to rehear a case en banc and provided an increase in the size
of the Ninth Circuit's en banc court to a majority of the active judges, made little headway and has not been
reintroduced.
67. Jason Hoppin, Supremes Go Easy on Ninth Circuit, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), June 30, 2000, at I
(quoting Arthur Hellman). Herald, while noting the justices' October 1996 Term reversal of several Ninth Circuit en
banc decisions, asserts that "the Ninth Circuit might have forestalled more reversals because the en banc panel's opinion
in five other cases... came closer to the Supreme Court's approach, and the Supreme Court denied the petitions for
certiorari in those cases." Herald, supra note 43, at 411.
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time and hassle of doing the inevitable." In short, if the lower court dealt with an issue
en banc, the justices would have less need to do so.
An en banc decision would also provide assurance that the doctrinal rule
announced by the courts of appeals was held by a majority of that court'sjudges. Even
the Ninth Circuit's limited en banc would provide greater assurance to that effect,
certainly more so than would a decision by a three-judge panel, particularly if the latter
were divided and contained a districtjudge or a visiting judge from another circuit. The
en banc court would entail the participation of more judges than a panel, 68 and thus,
apart from any action the Supreme Court might take, there would be some value added
through the virtue of democratizing the decision-making process by having more rather
than fewer judges participate in adopting the court of appeals' position.6 9
This reason for sitting en banc is a variation on the notion that more heads are
better than one-that an en banc court of appeals would engage in more thorough
consideration of the issues presented in the case. As Judge Stephen Reinhardt noted in
Senate testimony on another matter, in a then-recent Ninth Circuit en banc, to which
the Supreme Court had only two weeks before denied certiorari, the panel had voted
2-1 to affirm the state conviction (and death penalty) but the en banc court reversed,
10-1, "on a ground that avoided complex factual issues," with the dissenter (said Judge
Reinhardt) "complain[ing] only of the ground we chose." The key element, said Judge
Reinhardt, was "that the judge who wrote the majority opinion upholding the death
sentence the first time wrote the en banc opinion reversing his own decision over a year
later," with "no intervening cases or changes in the law." As he put it, "The judge
simply didn't see the issue the first time., 70
The lesson here is that en banc rehearing allows more complete consideration and
provides perspective not available to the panel. For those en banc cases to which the
justices do grant review, the participation of more judges may also mean that, in
reaching its conclusion, its opinions would present the Supreme Court with a wider
range of interpretations than a three-judge panel would be likely to provide. This would
make the justices better informed in deciding to grant review and then in developing
their own ruling. However, there may be enough material for the Supreme Court
without a court of appeals producing an en banc disposition. As one judge said, in
arguing against en banc in a case because there were "[f]orceful dissents" in both the
Ninth Circuit and another court of appeals, the Supreme Court, if it "wishes to consider
the issue, . . . certainly has enough grist for the mill."
If the courts of appeals do assist the Supreme Court in the manner discussed by
undertaking en banc activity, what effect would this have on Supreme Court review of
courts of appeals rulings? If division within a panel and conflict among circuits send
signals to the Supreme Court that a certiorari petition from such cases might warrant
greater attention, the very fact that a court of appeals has heard a case en banc provides
the justices with such a signal. Thus, "at the individual case level, an en banc hearing

68. Before its expansion in 1978, the First Circuit had only three active-duty judges, so a panel composed of
those judges was identical with the court sitting en banc.
69. 1am indebted to Wayne Logan for this suggestion.
70. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, testimony to Senate Judiciary Committee, on report of Powell Committee (Ad Hoc
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases) (Nov. 5, 1990).
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may enhance the likelihood of Supreme Court review." However, to the extent that a
court of appeals' en banc activity conveys to the justices that the appeals court is
"policing errant panels independently" and thus "in the aggregate, en banc hearings
7
should decrease the likelihood of certiorari over all cases from that circuit." '

If the Supreme Court did grant review after a court of appeals sat en banc to
consider an issue, would the justices be more likely or less likely to affirm the lower
court than if only a three-judge court of appeals panel had decided the case? If en banc
sittings reduced the rate at which a court of appeals was overturned, it would be
important both instrumentally-because it would indicate less instability in the
law-and perceptually, in that the court would have a higher reputation for
competence. 2 Unless the justices are suggesting that the courts of appeals should sit
en banc only to have them go through their paces, their remarks might lead one to
expect a higher rate of affirmance of en banc decisions than of panel dispositions. Yet,
to the extent it is based primarily on a desire for a more-informed lower courtjudgment
from which to work, the suggestion does not cut one way or the other with respect to
affirmance or reversal. Because cases heard en banc are disproportionately those
involving important issues, one might expect that when those dispositions reached the
Supreme Court, thejustices not only would be quite likely to grant review but also that
they would be at least as inclined to reverse as they are with other cases which they
decide to review.
2. How It Looks to the Courts of Appeals
If at least some of the justices believe that it makes sense from the Supreme
Court's perspective for the courts of appeals to sit en banc more often, what is the view
from the courts of appeals? Do theirjudges believe it makes more sense to sit en banc?
The Supreme Court's disposition of en banc rulings compared with its treatment of
rulings from three-judge panels may well matter to lawyers, in terms of whether they
seek rehearing en banc in the court of appeals before petitioning for certiorari. This
information may matter especially to the judges of the courts of appeals. One
consideration for those judges is results-having the courts of appeals' dispositions
upheld or at least left undisturbed. If the Supreme Court turns away most en banc
dispositions, it would make sense for the courts of appeals to follow the advice to sit
en banc. This would also be the case if thejustices affirm many of the en banc rulings
it does review. Cutting the other way, however, is that an en banc sitting might make
it more likely that the justices would grant review, not only because the case would be
better developed but because an en banc disposition calls greater attention to a case,
providing a cue or signal for thejustices in deciding which cases to review. We can see

71. Stefanie Lindquist et al., One Principal and Multiple Agents: Supreme CourtAuditing ofthe United States
Courts ofAppeals, 13, 30 n. 11 (2000) (paper presented to American Political Science Association) (originally titled
"Supreme Court Monitoring of the Federal Circuit Courts: An Institutional Perspective") (on file with author).
72. For the distinction, see Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 432.
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this in ajudge' s comment that creating an intercircuit conflict would "put pressure on
the Supreme Court. 73
If review is regularly granted to en banc rulings and if those rulings are reversed
at least as frequently as panel dispositions, not only do the justices appear to be saying,
"Do as I say, not do as I do," but it makes little sense for the courts of appeals to hear
cases en banc. If the only benefit of a court of appeals en banc sitting is for the benefit
of the principal, the Supreme Court, why should the agent, a court of appeals, engage
in that activity? (However, if courts of appeals judges disagree with the justices' advice
to go en banc, they might not disagree in public, on the theory that one ought not
openly sass one's superiors. 74 ) If en banc rehearing is supposed to be an institutional
means for relieving pressure on the Supreme Court and yet it appears not to provide the
lower court with benefits as measured in results, thejudges of those lower courts might
be less likely to engage in the procedure. The Supreme Court's reduction in the number
of cases it decides on the merits would make this particularly likely. "I was never
convinced," observed a Ninth Circuit judge, "that a court taking 80 cases a year was
so overworked that we had a public duty to hold en bancs to lighten their burden. 75
Even when the Supreme Court treats courts of appeals en banc decisions much as
it does panel rulings, the lower courts may not see an advantage in taking cases en
banc. Looking in late 2000, at the Supreme Court's six then most recent terms, one
Ninth Circuit judge noted, "[O]ur overall record of en banc decisions being reversed
(at least in part) is not that much different than that of three-judge panel decisions."
Although careful not to take a position on whether the Ninth Circuit should increase
its en banc activity,76 the judge stressed that "it is clear that rehearing a case en banc
is no guarantee that the Supreme Court will let the en banc decision stand." In
responding, a colleague did seem to suggest that an increase in en banc banc sittings
would not hurt the Ninth Circuit: "[A]n increase in the number of cases taken en banc
has not resulted in an increase in the number of those cases taken for review. To the
contrary, if anything, it has resulted in a decrease." Going further, some have seen a
relationship between the increased number of en bancs in the late 1990s and the Ninth
Circuit's record in the Supreme Court as measured by the number of cases thejustices
took for the 1999 Term (ten), 77 but the near-doubling in the number of Ninth Circuit
cases in the 2000 Term makes it difficult to sustain that argument.

73. "Because of the exceptional importance of this issue, I have no reluctance to put pressure on the Supreme
Court by creating a conflict in the circuits" because the matter "has 'percolated' in the circuits long enough [and] it is
time for the Supreme Court to resolve it once and for all."
74. An example of something best said to one's colleagues and not directly to "the Supremes" is the remark by
former Chief Judge Richard Chambers, commenting on his colleagues' decision to rehear en banc Watkins v. United
States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989): "[T]ime and time again I have heard members of our court ask ajustice at recesses of our meetings whether the
justices really appreciated our work spent on en bancs, and the answer is, 'Yes, of course', which I regard as a pleasant
social fabrication, but not alie." Judge Richard Chambers ("A Voice from the Cemetery") to Associates, May 17 1989
[hereinafter Chambers Letter].
75. E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, to Professor Stephen L. Wasby
(July 29, 1999) (on file with author).
76. "This is not to say we should rehear cases en banc more often or less often..."
77. See Hoppin, supra note 67, at 1.
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A related concern for courts of appealsjudges relates to the need to "move cases,"
that is, the institutional concern of bringing cases to their conclusion. An en banc
hearing delays the arrival at the Supreme Court of a case that was likely bound to reach
there in any event. Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit has noted that after a panel's
decision, "some further not insignificant amount of time will pass before the case is
actually argued before the en banc court," 78 which he notes may be two or three
months, with more time then elapsing while opinions are prepared- indeed, more time
than that entailed in preparation of opinions in a panel.7 9
Former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, for many years the court's
en banc coordinator, has been reported to say that "'losing an en bane request can be
the best thing for litigants in some cases. If we take a case en banc, it will spend
another year in our court.... If it is clear the case will end up before the Supreme
Court sooner or later, it may savejudicial resources to deny the rehearing en bane and
let the parties seek cert at the Supreme Court immediately."' 80 As he put it more
recently, "To go en banc is to create a one-year delay in the case for the parties and
burns up judicial resources. If the Supreme Court is going to take it, let's let them get
at it.""
Comments made during consideration of whether to rehear a case en banc show
that otherjudges agree with this position. For example, ajudge who was arguing that
a case, while "important but not extraordinary," was not "en banc worthy," said that
if the Supreme Court believed the Ninth Circuit had relied on a case mistakenly or
wished to disavow that case, "this is precisely the kind of case the Court is likely to
take on." Thus, he said, "There seems to be no good reason to delay the government's
petition for certiorari." In a later memorandum, the judge argued further, "Panel
autonomy should extend to deciding cases in accordance with a responsible reading of
Supreme Court precedent as it stands at the time, not as it may become if the Supreme
Court decides to change direction, or to qualify or condition existing precedent. If the
Supreme Court wishes to modify its precedent, that is a task for the Supreme Court to
undertake." That was something the justices could do without the court of appeals first
sitting en banc. This view applies even with respect to intercircuit conflicts, which, as
noted earlier, some consider create a particular need for en banc consideration. There
is little mention of the need to go en banc to save the Supreme Court from having to
act to keep the law uniform.
The perspective of those voting against rehearing en banc, who might do so in
order to move a case more quickly to the Supreme Court, does not reach the public
prints, because they seldom comment on the denial of en banc. 8 Some judges have,
78. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 211 F.3d 853, 860 (4th Cir. 2000).
79. Id. "There is ...
every reason to believe that it might take longer given the statistically greater likelihood
of multiple writings ..."Id.
80. Steve Albert, The Ninth Circuit'sSecret Ballot, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 3, 1995, at 10.
81. Conversation with Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, in Sisters, Oregon (Oct. 11 1999).
82. But see Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1994), reh 'g en banc denied, 15 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir.
1994) (Trott, J., concurring in rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc); Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F3d 691 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc denied, 113 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Hawkins, J., concurring in rejecting suggestion of rehearing en banc); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d
1270 (9th Cir. 1998), Kleinfeld, J., concurring in rejection of suggestion of rehearing en banc). For a concurrence in a
denial of rehearing en banc that comes close to reading like a dissent, see Malone v.Calderon, 164 F.3d 1210, 1211 (9th
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however, commented on the matter. Speaking to Judge Wallace's suggestion for taking
cases en banc when there was an intercircuit conflict, Judge Goodwin, in noting that
he had learned from former Chief Judge Richard Chambers, "Why delay for another
year?", explained, "If it is going to the Supreme Court, why crush in another year's
delay."83
Judge Chambers had voiced his view in a memorandum to his colleagues objecting
to the court's decision to go en banc in a case. "Almost certainly the Supreme Court
will take this case," he observed, "and, as usual, not pay too much attention to us, even
if they affirm" the en banc opinion. Moreover, he added, "75 pages on this case in our
court is too many when the justices will dispose of it in seven pages or so."'8 4 Judge
Goodwin also noted that the Second Circuit had stated publicly the position he was
advocating: "[i]f it is important enough for en banc, it is important enough for the
Supreme Court." He added that he "usually voted no on 'mere' intercircuit conflicts
because I thought that the Supreme Court should take care of the problem, and that our
taking it85en banc would just delay the relief the parties wanted and needed for at least
a year.
In another case, the heart of a debate about going en banc was whether the
Supreme Court would resolve an issue on which the circuits conflicted. The panel
majority argued that taking the case en banc "will not create national uniformity," as
"[oinly the Supreme Court or Congress can do that now." They thought it "likely that
the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in one or more of the cases" from the various
circuits," as, they added, "it certainly should." Somewhat later, the judge who had
called for en banc rehearing asserted, "[T]here is no guarantee that the Supreme Court
will resolve the issue ..... Nor, argued thejudge, should Supreme Court consideration
deprive the Ninth Circuit of its opportunity to examine the issue; even if the justices
granted review, "this should not prevent us from giving this issue the type of
consideration that it deserves and that the other circuits have afforded it."
The panel majority in turn argued that even with a Ninth Circuit en banc ruling, "a
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court will be required" because of the intercircuit
conflict; this made rehearing en banc "both unnecessary and inefficient." When,
sometime later, after another member of the court had suggested a possible
compromise, the Supreme Court did accept a Fifth Circuit case on the issue, one of the
majority judges asserted that amending the panel's opinion "now seems imprudent,"
adding, "Let the Supreme Court decide it!" Or, as the judge put it shortly thereafter,
"Ultimately, the Supreme Court's guidance will resolve the issue for the many cases
which have been litigated in every circuit in the country ... I urge that we simply sit
back and, when the time comes, take our cue on this sticky issue from the Supreme
Court."

Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.).
83. Interview with Judge Alfred T. Goodwin in Pasadena, California (Jan. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Goodwin
Interview].
84. Chambers Letter, supra note 74. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
85. Goodwin Interview, supra note 74. In his Madison Lecture on the Thompson death penalty case, Judge
Reinhardt quoted from a March 20, 1997, memorandum by Judge Robert Beezer to all judges, concerning the decision
by the panel not to extend the time for an en banc call: "We see no reason to delay further consideration of this case by
the Supreme Court." Reinhardt, supra note 62, at 333.
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Some of these concerns about not expending resources on en banc hearing when
the Supreme Court will decide the matter do apply as well to decisions by three-judge
panels. If the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case with the same or a related
issue as the one before the panel, the lower court judges are likely to wait until the
matter is decided. As a Ninth Circuitjudge has noted, the panel may tell the lawyer at
oral argument, with respect to a position or case being argued, "We'll wait for the
Supreme Court." Or, as he observed separately as to why the panel should defer
disposition in such situations, "Why write in washable ink"?
IV. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF EN BANCS: ALL CIRCUITS

We now turn to examination of the Supreme Court's treatment of the courts of
appeals cases heard en banc. (See Table I.) We begin our discussion with the high
court's treatment of en banc rulings from all circuits, along with thejustices' mention
of en banc rulings and of published dissents from denials of rehearing en banc. A more
particular look at thejustices' treatment of Ninth Circuit en banc cases, along with the
justices' mention of such cases, follows in the next section.
A.

The Overall Picture

Before three-judge district courts were eliminated, and also prior to the 1986
statute further limiting direct appeals, a smaller proportion of the cases the justices
heard came from the courts of appeals, because some cases that would otherwise have
gone first to the courts of appeals came directly to the Supreme Court from the district
courts, and because the appeal category still contained many cases from the states. The
Supreme Court's treatment of en banc court of appeals rulings from 1969 through the
1970s thus takes place against a background different from that after 1986, when
almost all cases came to the Supreme Court on certiorari and proportionately more of
the cases came from the courts of appeals even as the justices began their 1990s
reduction in cases decided on the merits. (It is possible that the decrease in the number
of cases the Supreme Court heard resulted in part, but only in part, from a decrease in
conflict between circuits. 8 6 On the other hand, the increase in the number of cases

decided on the merits may leave more inconsistent circuit rulings.)
Most court of appeals cases the Supreme Court hears are from three-judge panels.
For all their talk about the need for courts of appeals to hear cases en banc, of the cases
the justices decide in any term, en banc cases are never more than a small portion of
all the cases from the courts of appeals, although the number varies widely from term
to term.87 In some terms, virtually no Supreme Court decisions came in cases heard en
banc in the courts of appeals, but in others, there were as many as ten in which the

86. Arthur Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, Sup. CT. REV. 403, 414-16 (1996).
87, Determining these cases requires examination of both the West headnote for the case and the Supreme Court
opinion. At times en banc rehearing is mentioned not in the Supreme Court opinion but only in the West headnote. In
some (earlier) cases, there is no mention of en banc activity in the headnote but there is a brief mention in the opinion,
perhaps in a footnote, for example, that there were three judges who dissented from a denial of rehearing en banc.
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lower court had sat en banc, and in other cases, there had been published dissents from
denials of rehearing en banc.
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In the Supreme Court's 1989-1998 Terms, as the justices began to reduce their
output to not much more than 80 cases per term, they reviewed almost 800 panel
rulings from the courts of appeals but only 56 (7.1%) of these were en banc
dispositions.8 8 (See Table IA.) This was a decline from the previous decade (O.T. 1979-

1988): with many more Supreme Court rulings, over 1,000 came from courts of
appeals panels, with 91 (8.0%) from those courts sitting en banc, an increase from the
previous decade. In the earliest of the decades studied (O.T. 1969 - O.T. 1978), roughly
850 decided cases came from courts of appeals panels, while fewer than 50 (47, or

88. The Supreme Court reviewed only two en banc rulings in OT. 1999, affirming the courts of appeals in both,
and there were three in OT. 2000-one affirmed, one reversed, and one affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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5.4%) had been decided en banc, a smaller portion that in either of the succeeding
decades.
Table IA
Supreme Court: En Banc v. Panel, by Decade
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Note: "sp" ("split") means decisions which the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
In the first line of data, such "split" rulings are included with "Other" (reversed or vacated), so that the
"Affirm" column contains only those cases affirmed in full.
The second line of data, beginning with the number of "split" dispositions, counts a "split" decision as .5
affirmance, .5 other.

In the Supreme Court's 1969-1998 Terms, there were at least fifty cases in which
there is some notation in the Supreme Court's opinion that courts of appeals judges
dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, although this undoubtedly understates the
number. 89 In the 1969-1978 Terms, there were only eight such cases discovered, with
none in five of those terms. However, there were twenty-three in the 1979-1988 Terms,
with from one to four per term (but none in O.T. 1980), and nineteen in the 1989-1998
Terms, with none in four of those years (1989-1991, 1993).90
An examination of some Supreme Court terms provides an indication of the role
en banc rulings play in its output. The 1981 Term was one of the first with more than
ten en banc rulings reviewed. There were fourteen in which the courts of appeals had
sat en banc, plus two in which there had been dissents from denials of rehearing en
banc, with considerable previous en banc activity at earlier stages of one of the latter.9t
The justices divided about evenly in their treatment of the en bancs, affirming six,
affirming in part and reversing in part in one, and reversing or vacating in the others.
Of the nine 1986 Term en banc cases, three involved capital punishment and two
others concerned other important criminal procedure issues. The capital punishment

89. The Supreme Court appears not to recognize this activity in every instance.
90. In each of O.T. 1999 and 2000, thejustices decided three cases in which rehearing en banc had been denied
over published dissents; in the former term, all three were reversed in whole or in part, while in the latter term, one was
affirmed, there was one "split decision," and the third was reversed and remanded.
91. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Justice O'Connor, for the Court, noted that rehearing en banc
had been denied "Over a vigorous dissent ..."Id. at 159.
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cases were McCleskey v. Kemp, 92 on racial discrimination in death penalty cases, where
the justices affirmed an en banc ruling with no prior panel disposition; Hitchcock v.
Dugger,93 on proper instructions for an advisory sentencing jury, reversing an en banc
court which had echoed the panel; and Ricketts v. Adamson.94 In the last, where the

Ninth Circuit en banc had reversed the district court's habeas dismissal, the Supreme
Court majority held that a state could prosecute a defendant on its original murder
charges, leading to a capital sentence, for failing to comply with a plea agreement
under which he would have received a sentence less than death. 95 The two other
criminal justice cases were O'Lone v. Shabazz,96 on accommodating religious beliefs
in prison, reversing a Third Circuit en banc (with no panel), and Greer v. Miller,97 on
a prosecutor's questioning of a defendant and his post-arrest silence, reversing an en
banc court which had taken the panel's position.
In the 1988 Term, in disposing of eleven en bancs, the Supreme Court affirmed
five, including the crucial federal habeas corpus ruling, Teague v. Lane;98 affirmed one
in part and reversed in part; and reversed or vacated in five. There were also three cases
in which there were published dissents from denial of en banc rehearing, all of which
were reversed in whole or in part.
In the 1992 and 1994 Terms, the number of cases the justices heard in which there
were published dissents from en banc denials equaled or exceeded the number of en
bancs reviewed. In O.T. 1992, there were five of the former including two Ninth
Circuit cases implicating capital punishment, and five en bancs were reviewed, while
in the 1994 Term, only two en bancs were reviewed, both (including Judge Aguilar's
case) from the Ninth Circuit, while there were five cases, including two from the
Eighth Circuit, with published dissents from denials of rehearing en banc, with the
justices reversing or vacating all in whole or in part. In two other cases, the courts of
appeals had modified opinions on petitions for rehearing, but that action saved neither
from reversal.
In the 1995 Term, the Supreme Court reviewed six en bancs, including two from
the Seventh Circuit (both affirmed) and two from the District of Columbia Circuit (one
affirmed, the other a "split" ruling), one from the Ninth Circuit, and one from the
seldom-reviewed Federal Circuit. Both Seventh Circuit cases were affirmed; in one,
there had been no pre-en banc panel and in the other, the en banc had reversed the
Federal Railroad Administration after the panel had affirmed the agency.
The picture in the D.C. Circuit cases was more complex. In Denver Area
Educational Telecommunication Consortium v. FCC,99 on obscene and indecent
programming on cable television, the panel had remanded the case to the Federal
Communication Commission but the en banc, 7-4, had affirmed the agency, and

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

481
481
483
483
482
483
489
518

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

279 (1987).
393 (1987).
1 (1987).
1 (1987).
342 (1987).
756 (1987).
288 (1989).
727 (1996).
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Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, while in Bailey v. UnitedStates, '°
where thejustices reversed the en banc disposition, the en banc court had affirmed two
convictions for use of a gun in connection with a drug crime after one panel had
overturned a conviction for insufficient evidence to support "use" but another had
sustained a conviction.
In 1996, a term in which the Ninth Circuit fared particularly poorly at the Supreme
Court's hands,'0 ' of the twenty-seven Ninth Circuit cases thejustices overturned three
en bancs. These en bancs included the English-as-official-language case, where the en
banc and panel had both overturned the statute but the Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the case had long since been mooted, 10 2 and the assisted-suicide case,
where the justices adopted the result the panel's result denying a right to assisted
suicide. 03
In the 1997 Term, seven en banc rulings were reviewed, with only two affirmed.
One was the Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,'° 4 sexual harassment case from the
Seventh Circuit. In both that case and one case from the D.C. Circuit, in which the
panel had itself sought en banc, the court of appeals had done what the justices
appeared to wish-gone en banc to deal with a problem-but only in Burlington
Industrieshad that resulted in thejustices' affirmance. In two of those either reversed
or vacated, including the Eleventh Circuit's companion to Burlington Industries,'0 5 the
en banc had reached the same outcome as had the panel, perhaps making these cases
examples of an expenditure of court of appeals' resources with no effect on the
ultimate Supreme Court outcome. In three cases, the en banc court had overturned the
panel disposition, with the effect of restoring the panel ruling, making these cases
further instances of use of resources for en banc to no avail, although the en banc
activity might have attracted the Supreme Court's attention. The third instance in which
the justices overturned the en banc ruling in favor of the panel disposition was
Calderonv. Thompson. 106 There the en banc process itself was the issue at the heart of
the Supreme Court's ruling, as the en banc Ninth Circuit had recalled the mandate in
a death penalty case in which the panel had overturned a district judge's grant of
habeas relief and had denied a stay of execution.
B. En Bancs in Supreme Court Opinions
Beyond the outcomes, what do the justices say about court of appeals en banc
rulings? Most of the time the justices go about the business of developing the law
without discussing the lower court's prior work, simply stating and discussing the law

100. 516 U.S. 137(1995).
101. See generallyHerald, supra note 43; Stephen L. Wasby, The Ninth Circuitand the Supreme Court: Relations

Between Higherand Lower Courts, paper presented to American Political Science Association, 1998 (on file with
author).
102. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). An important point about this case is that,
subsequent to the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit on procedural grounds, the Arizona Supreme Court
found the "official English" initiative invalid-the position of the Ninth Circuit en banc majority.
103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
104. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
105. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
106. 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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in terms of its own precedents, rather than dealing with details in the lower court
opinion or correcting that court's error. In reciting the history of the case in the lower
courts, including its progress through the appellate courts before certiorari is granted,
thejustices generally report the fact of an en banc disposition and any preceding panel
action. Seldom is anything more said; indeed, as noted earlier, after the case's history
has been recited, the court of appeals opinion may never again be mentioned, and in
some cases it is difficult to find even that type of notation. One seldom finds any more
reference to an en banc disposition than one would find to any lower court disposition.
However, sometimes a case contains relatively frequent mention of en banc activity,
and the Supreme Court opinion may play off the lower court opinion, closely parsing
it or at least quoting from it often as the Court's views are laid out. However, when this
occurs, there is not much difference from the way the justices might play off an opinion
from a court of appeals panel or a state supreme court, including a reference to any
dissent.
Perhaps none of this is surprising. The old saw that the court reviews judgments,
not opinions,'0 7 helps explain why in many cases the justices base their writings on
their own caselaw without mention of what court of appeals judges have written. So
does the fact that the Supreme Court seldom praises individual judges or lower courts
for "getting it right." If this is so, why should the justices, not in the business of
handing out kudos, do so because a court of appeals acted on what some justices
individually have said to a circuit judicial conference or even to the White
Commission? For the justices to thank the lower court for rehearing a case en banc
when they have just reversed or vacated makes little sense, but one does not find
comment even if the en banc court "got it right," particularly if it overturned a panel
in so doing.
1.

The En Bancs Themselves

Let us now turn to examples from recent Supreme Court terms. Asjust explained,
at times the recitation of lower court activity and of the en banc is extremely short. For
example, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railroad Co.10 8 contains only the following: "A three-judge panel of the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the FRA's [Federal Railroad Administration] order, but that opinion
was superseded when the Seventh Circuit took the case en banc. The en banc court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation is limbo time. ' 9 Inthe same term, another Seventh Circuit en banc,
concerning the Sentencing Guidelines, received like treatment: "On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District Court that
a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this, and it
affirmed petitioner's sentence."' 0

107. Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292,297 (1956). "This Court reviews judgments, not statements in opinions."
108. 516 U.S. 152(1996).
109. Id. at 156. The Ninth Circuits earlier case was mentioned because the FRA had acquiesced in that court's
interpretation.
110. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 288 (1996).
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Another example of this type of brief treatment is O'Dell v.Netherland,"' a federal
habeas capital case from the 1996 Term. Recitation of the court of appeals en banc
ruling, which the justices affirmed, consumed only a relatively short paragraph:
A divided en banc Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. After
exhaustive review of our precedents, the Court of Appeals majority
determined that "Simmons was the paradigmatic 'new rule,"' and, as such,
could not aid petitioner. The Fourth Circuit was closely divided as to whether
Simmons set forth a new rule, but every member of the court agreed that
petitioner's 'claim of actual innocence [was] not even colorable.""'12
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,' from the same term, we find, in the first paragraph of
Justice Thomas's opinion, "The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that the term 'employees' in §704(a) referred only to current
employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not cognizable under Title VII," while
immediately following, in the history of the case, he states that "a divided panel of the
Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en
banc, vacated the panel decision, and thereafter affirmed the District Court's
determination that former employees may not bring suit under §704(a) for retaliation
occurring after termination of their employment."" 14
The treatment in Kawaauhauv. Geiger," 5 from the 1997 Term, was about the same
length as that in Robinson, but it included one sentence stating the court of appeals'
holding and noting awareness of intercircuit conflict:
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, and a divided en banc court adhered to the panel's position. Section
523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge, the en banc court held, is confined to
debts 'based on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort.' On
this view, a debt for malpractice, because it is based on conduct that is
negligent or reckless, rather than intentional, remains dischargeable.
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of §523(a)(b)
diverged from the previous holdings of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.' 16
Shortly afterwards, the Court limited its description of lower court activity in an
election law case to this: "The District Court granted summary judgment for the FEC
[Federal Election Commission], and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The en banc Court of Appeals reversed, however, on the ground that the FEC' s 'major
'
purpose' test improperly interpreted the Act's definition of a 'political committee.""i 17

111. 521 U.S. 151 (1997).

112. Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
113. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 340.
523 U.S. 57 (1998).
id. at 60.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 18 (1998).
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And, in the following term, mention of en banc activity in Dickinson v. Zurko,"18 on
review of Patent Office rulings, was similarly brief: "The Federal Circuit, hoping
definitively to resolve the review-standard controversy, then heard the matter en banc.
After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the
stricter court/court standard was legally proper."" 9
Supreme Court treatment of a case could be quite compressed even when there was
a dissent in the en banc court and more than one en banc hearing. An example is
Jefferson County Alabama v. Acker,' 20 on whether an Alabama license tax could be
applied to federal judges; there had been two en banc sittings in the case. Justice
Ginsburg noted that after an Eleventh Circuit panel had first reversed the district court,
"the Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court's disposition," and after a
Supreme Court remand to consider application of the Tax Injunction
Act, "On remand,
121
the Eleventh Circuit adhered to its prior en banc decision."'
Of course, thejustices are capable of longer treatment of the rulings below, even
when those rulings are not the grist for their opinions. Such longer treatment is
illustrated by Wilson v. Layne,122 on media "ride-alongs" during searches. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, noting the action of a divided panel, then wrote:
The case was twice reheard en banc, where a divided Court of Appeals again
upheld the defense of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether the actions of the police violated the Fourth Amendment. It
concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time of the search)
that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the Fourth
Amendment, the right allegedly violated by petitioners was not 'clearly
established' and thus qualified immunity was proper. Fivejudges dissented,
arguing that the officers' actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, and that
the clearly12 established
protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated in
3
this case.
Somewhat lengthier treatment of the en banc, along with later brief references at
the end of the opinion to both en banc majority and dissent, could be found in Ruhrgas
AG v. MarathonOil Co. 124There Justice Ginsburg reported that "The Fifth Circuit, on
its own motion, granted rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel decision. In a 9to-7 decision, the en banc court held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide
issues of subject-matterjurisdiction first....,125 After completing that paragraph about
the en banc majority, she devoted a paragraph to Judge Higginbotham's decision for
seven dissenting judges.2 6 Then, at the end of a relatively short opinion, she referred

118. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
119. Id. at 153-54.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

527 U.S. 423 (1999).
Id. at 430.
526 U.S. 603 (1999).
Id. at 608.
526 U.S. 574 (1999).
Id. at 582.
id.
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to one position taken by the Fifth Circuit and the respondent before quickly rejecting
it, and, on her way to reversing the Fifth Circuit, twice quoted Judge Higginbotham by
name, with her last paragraph beginning with the construction, "In accord with Judge
Higginbotham . ,127
Still more extended treatment of lower court activity appears in United States v.
Irvine, 128 the one en banc ruling reviewed in the 1993 Term. The treatment took the
form of a several paragraph report of the history of the case andof the basic argument
of the lower courts. Justice Souter, for the majority, after reporting the district court's
action, stated, "A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed.... rejected the view that the Regulation is inapplicable to a trust created
before the enactment of the gift tax statute" and held taxable the transfer creating the
trust. Introducing another circuit's involvement with the same issue, he observed, "The
court adopted the reasoning of its sister court for the Eleventh Circuit," 129 and stated
that court's holding before continuing with the Eighth Circuit panel's holding. 130 He
then turned to a paragraph-long treatment of the Eighth Circuit en banc activity:
"Respondent's suggestion for rehearing en banc was granted, however, and the panel
opinion was vacated. Unlike the panel, the en banc court affirmed the District Court,
holding the Regulation inapplicable ... ";he followed that comment with a report of
the substance of the en banc court's ruling. Recitation of the concurring opinion by
Judge Loken (mentioned by name) followed in a paragraph which ended with a single
sentence about the dissent: "The dissent took the position of the majority in the panel
opinion, and of the Eleventh Circuit.. .

."'

Despite the length of this recitation,

having concluded it, Justice Souter made no further reference to the lower court
opinion.
The length of the history of the case presented in the Supreme Court's opinion may
be increased by the presence of separate opinions in the en banc court, which are not
unlikely because the cases reheard en banc are the more contentious ones. When the
Court continued to grapple with regulation of indecent material on the Internet, Justice
Breyer provided the history of the D.C. Circuit case being reviewed:
A panel of that Circuit agreed with petitioners that the provisions violated the
First Amendment. The entire Court of Appeals, however, heard the case en
banc and reached the opposite conclusion. It held that all three statutory
provisions (as implemented) were consistent with the First Amendment. Four
of the eleven en banc appeals court judges dissented. Two of the dissenting
judges concluded that all three provisions violated the First Amendment. Two
others thought that either one, 13or2 two, but not all three of the provisions,
violated the First Amendment.

127. Id. at 587.
128. 511 U.S. 224 (1994).

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231-32.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 736 (1996) (citations omitted).
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Yet, except for brief mention in the first paragraph of the opinion's next section, there
is no other mention of the lower court opinion in any of the (six) opinions contributed
by various justices, except for one passing remark by Justice Kennedy, "The plurality
at least recognizes
this as state action, ... avoiding the mistake made by the Court of
133
Appeals."'

The justices' mention of dissents in an en banc court can also be seen in this
compact paragraph when they dealt with anti-abortion protests:
[A] panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in a split
decision. The Court of Appeals then heard the case en banc, and affirmed the
District Court by a divided vote. Each of two opinions garnered a majority of
the court. Judge Oakes' lead opinion,joined by eight otherjudges, affirmed
for reasons that closely track the reasoning of the District Court. A concurring
opinion by Judge Winter, joined by nine otherjudges, affirmed primarily on
the ground that the protestors' expressive activities were not protected by the
First Amendment at all, and because the District Court's injunction was a
"reasonable response" to the protestors' conduct.13 4
Despite the presence of those two separate opinions in the lower court, each of which
was joined by a number ofjudges, the body of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the court contains only references to the district court but not to the opinions in the
court of appeals. However, Justice Breyer, concurring and dissenting, did so in
referring to an issue that had come to the surface during en banc oral argument, which
Justice Breyer felt had been handled
by the Second Circuit in a way that was "both
3
'1
sensible."
and
proper
legally
The detail with which divisions in an en banc court could be described is also seen
in the earlier UnitedStatesv. Fradycase. 136There Justice O'Connor recited the several
divisions in the en banc court, which had unanimously affirmed one conviction and had
affirmed another conviction over a single dissent, but had overturned the death
sentence by a 5-4 vote, with four majority judges adopting one position but with the
"fifth and deciding vote" coming from a judge who argued for bifurcating the trial's
guilt and sentencing components. ' When defendant brought a collateral attack on his
conviction,
the court of appeals had denied rehearing en banc "[o]ver a vigorous
138
dissent."'

In Bailey v. United States, on "use" of a gun in a drug-related offense, where the
justices reversed and remanded a D.C. Circuit en banc ruling, dissents from that en
banc ruling had the effect of lengthening treatment of lower court action. Justice
O'Connor provided a quite extensive report on the lower court activity-there were
two separate convictions, each initially heard by different appellate panels, and then
133.
omitted).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at782 (Kennedy, J., concurring, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citations
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 371 (1997) (citations omitted).
Id. at 395.
456 U.S. 152 (1982).
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 159.
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an en banc sitting-that occupied virtually an entire page in the Supreme Court
Reporter, including a paragraph on the two dissents, by Judge Wald and by Judge
Williams (with two other judges). 3 9 When Justice O'Connor, in the body of her
opinion, said, "Where the Court of Appeals erred was not in its conclusion that 'use'
means more than mere possession, but in its standard for evaluating whether the
involvement of a firearm amounted to something more than mere possession," she
referred to Judge Williams' dissent, quoting from it to say that, "Rather than requiring
actual use, the District of Columbia Circuit would criminalize 'simpl[e] possession
with a floating intent to use,"' and quoting at greater length from it as to the
"shortcomings" of the D.C. Circuit's test. 140 She also noted Judge Wald's dissent with
a "compare" cite somewhat later in saying, "A possibly more difficult question arises
where an offender
conceals a gun nearby to be at the ready for an imminent
141
confrontation."'
Several sexual harassment cases provide a further example of the effect of the
presence of more than one opinion in the court of appeals on the Supreme Court' s
recitation of a case's history. Davis v.Monroe County Boardof Education142contains
one paragraph reciting the court of appeals panel's ruling, a paragraph about the
Eleventh Circuit en banc rehearing that "affirmed the District Court's decision to
dismiss petitioner's Title IX claim against the Board" and the theory on which that
ruling was based, and a paragraph stating the position of the four judges who had
dissented from the en banc ruling-and
whose position prevailed, as the Supreme
4
Court reversed the court of appeals.1 1
Near the beginning of the opinion for the Court in the previous term's Burlington
Industriesv. Ellerth,'44 a description of the opinions in the Seventh Circuit's en banc
ruling consumed almost a full Supreme Court Reporter page, because, as Justice
Kennedy put it, the court of appeals "consensus disintegrated on the standard for an
employer's liability for such a claim," with multiple opinions resulting, each of which
required description. 14'Even after that lengthy recitation, the Seventh Circuit case is
not mentioned again, at least not in that case, although Justice Souter did mention
Judge Posner's concurring and dissenting Ellerth opinion in the companion case of
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,146 which contained a three-fourths page description
of the Eleventh Circuit en banc ruling. In Faragher,unlike Ellerth,the court of appeals
en banc ruling did receive reference later in the Supreme Court's opinion, when Justice
Souter stated three possible grounds for vicarious liability the court of appeals had
identified and rejected, using them as foci for his discussion, but no more, although he47
also referred to "the Court of Appeals's indulgent gloss on the relevant evidence." 1
139. 516 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1995).
140. Id. at 143-44. She also quoted Justice Breyer, from an opinion he wrote as Chief Judge of the First Circuit.
Id. at 144.
141. Id. at 149. She described Judge Wald's dissent as "discussing distinction between firearm's accessibility to
drugs or drug proceeds and its accessibility to defendant." Id.
142. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
143. Id. at 637.
144. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
145. Id. at 750-51.
146. 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (quoting Judge Posner).
147. Id. at 793.
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In aid of the majority's conclusion, he made a positive statement about the en banc's
dissent and quoted from it in two places.'48
As this discussion indicates, there are instances in which the en banc dissenters'
view is explicitly taken over by the Supreme Court majority. Thus, in MIS Bremen v.
ZapataOff-Shore Co., 4 9 Chief Justice Burger wrote, "Wehold, with the six dissenting
members of the Court of Appeals, that far too little weight and effect were given to the
forum clause in resolving this controversy," and later, in disposition of an assertion by
the en banc majority, he used an extended quotation from Judge Wisdom, who had
written for the dissenters.'5 0 (A few terms later, a Supreme Court majority recognized,
and agreed with, the dissent from a panel ruling that the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
had subsequently overruled). 5 '
However, that the presence of a dissent to an en banc opinion does not necessarily
mean the Supreme Court will pay it heed even when the justices are setting aside the
court of appeals decision and thus reaching the same result as that dissent. In United
States v. Bestfoods, 5 2 where the justices vacated a Sixth Circuit en banc decision and
remanded with instructions, Justice Souter set out the en banc vote (7-6) and a lengthy
quote from the majority but gave no mention of the substance of the dissent. 153 In
addition, he twice referred to the court of appeals majority. He first said that "we are
satisfied that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the District Court's analysis of
directly liability. But we also think that the appeals court erred in limiting direct
liability under the statute to a parent's sole or joint venture operation." He then again
agreed that one test could not be used but stated that the court of appeals had "stopped
short when it confined examples of direct parental operation to exclusive or joint
ventures... "'154

The examples in this section also indicate that even when a Supreme Court opinion
provides an extended description of a case's en banc history, it does not necessarily
follow that the court of appeals opinion will be discussed when the author turns to the
issues. UnitedStates v. WinstarCorp. 5 5 provides an example of such limited use. After
providing background about the S & L controversy and the new federal statute that had
given risen to the case, Justice Souter, for the Court, described the history of this
particular case. He first noted the action of a "divided panel of the Federal Circuit," and
then noted, "The full court... vacated this decision and agreed to rehear the case en
banc. After rebriefing and reargument, the en banc court reversed the panel decision
and affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' rulings on liability." He then stated the en
banc court's holdings, after which he recited the separate dissents on different grounds
by Judge Nies and Judge Lourie.'56 While Justice Souter did draw on the Federal
148. Id. at 797 ("a justification for holding the offensive behavior with the scope of Terry's and Silverman's
employment was well put in Judge Barkett's dissent"); id. at 808.
149. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

150. Id. at 8, 16.
151. Territory of Guam v. Olson, 431 U.S. 195,201 (1977) ("Wefully agree with Judge Kennedy dissenting in
Agana Bay ....
").
152. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
153. Id. at 59-60.
154. Id. at 67, 71.
155. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
156. Id. at 859-60.
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Circuit's ruling in subsequent parts of his opinion, doing so to agree with the lower
court's findings, 5 7 when he turned to discussion of applicable law, he made virtually
no mention of the lower court opinion, except for one-quotation to support the point
that contracting parties often assume the risk of events outside their control and to
quote it for a general finding about changes in regulations.' 58
While these examples show that once the justices complete their recitation of a
case's history and proceed to discussion of the law, their references to en banc rulings
are often limited ones, there are instances in which en banc rulings are used more than
minimally in the latter key portion of the Supreme Court's opinion, providing its view
of what the law should be. Illustrating a scattering of such references through the
Supreme Court's several opinions is Kolstad v.American DentalAssociation,59 a case
on the standard for punitive damages in employment discrimination suits. In reporting
the D.C. Circuit's en banc treatment of the case, Justice O'Connor not only mentioned
the en banc majority but also briefly noted Judge Randolph's concurrence and Judge
Tatel's dissent "for five judges, who agreed generally with the panel majority."'160 In
the body of her opinion for the Court, which vacated and remanded the D.C. Circuit's
ruling, Justice O'Connor wrote, "We credit the en banc majority's effort to effectuate
Congressional intent, but, in the end, we reject its conclusion" about punitive
damages.' 6 '
Also mentioning the opinions in the lower court were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Stevens. The Chief Justice, who said, "For the reasons stated by Judge
Randolph in his concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals," he would hold that
egregiousness must be proved for someone to obtain punitive damages. 62 Disagreeing
with the majority's dealing with the unbriefed issue of imputing liability for punitives
on an agency theory and citing both the majority ruling below and Judge Tatel's
dissent, Justice Stevens said, "Nor did any of the 11 judges in the Court of Appeals
believe that it was applicable to the dispute at hand." He went on to add, "Judge Tatel,
who the Court implies raised the agency issue, in fact explicitly (and correctly)63
concluded that '[t]his case does not present these-or analogous circumstances.'"
The 1996 Term provides further examples.'64 In one, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded a case in which the "fractured en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed" a district court ruling on patent infringement. 65 Here only a brief
paragraph was devoted to stating the en banc majority's holding, but a much longer one

157. For example, Justice Souter stated, "We. .. have no reason to question the Court of Appeals's conclusion
that 'the government had an express contractual obligation to permit Glendale to count the supervisory goodwill
generated as a result of its merger with Broward as a capital asset for regulatory capital purposes."' Id. at 864; see also
id. at 865-66 ("In any event, we do not doubt the soundness of the Federal Circuit's finding that the overall
'documentation in the Winstar transaction establishes an express agreement allowing Winstar to proceed with the merger
plan approved by the Bank Board ..
.
158. Id. at 908, 906-07.
159. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
160. Id. at 533.
161. Id. at 534.
162. Id. at 537 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 552-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
165. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997).
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was necessary to state the basis for the "three separate dissents, commanding a total of
5 of 12judges.' 6 6 Most of that paragraph was devoted to the dissent by the late former
Chief Judge Helen Nies, on which Justice Thomas relied in writing for the Court.167
Shortly into the portion of his opinion in which he stated and dealt with petitioners'
arguments, he wrote, "We do... share the concern of the dissenters below that the
doctrine of equivalents... has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent
claims." He continued, "There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when
applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement," and then quoted at length from Judge Nies'
identification of a "means of avoiding this conflict,"
saying "We concur with this apt
' 168
reconciliation of our two lines of precedent."
Justice Thomas later noted that "considerable attention" had been given in the
lower court "to whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is a task for the judge
or for the jury." However, after noting that the issue had not been actively pursued in
the Supreme Court and that the question "of whether, or how much of, the application
of the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to
answer the question presented," he said "we decline to take it up. ' 169 However, he then
immediately turned to the Federal Circuit's holding "that it was for the jury to decide
whether the accused process was equivalent to the claimed process,' 170 a conclusion
for which he said "There was ample support in our prior cases," with no need to decide
the issue were it squarely presented afresh.'17
In UnitedStates v. Lanier,72
1 in which a state judge had been prosecuted in federal
court for violating the civil rights of his employees and women who came before his
court, is another example from O.T. 1996 of reference to an en banc ruling throughout
the Supreme Court's opinion. After first devoting considerable space, with quotations,
to describing the Sixth Circuit en banc ruling and also recounting the development of
the requirement of "fair warning" that the actions charged violated someone's civil
rights, Justice Souter observed, "The Sixth Circuit, in this case, added two glosses to
the made-specific standard of fair warning. "173
Differing from the lower court, he found
no requirement that "the extreme level of factual specificity envisioned by the Court
of Appeals is necessary in every instance to give fair warning."' 74 He immediately went
on to criticize the lower court for its reading of Screws v. UnitedStates.175 Although he
softened that criticism somewhat by saying that the Sixth Circuit was "rightly"
concerned "that disparate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law
insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered," he thought a categorical rule
was not necessary to deal with that concern. 176He went on to say that the Sixth Circuit

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at28-29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at38-39.

172. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
173. Id. at263.
174. Id. at268.
175. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
176. Lanier, 520 U.S. at269.
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standard "would lead trial judges to demand a degree of certainty at once unnecessarily
high and likely to beget much wrangling," a "danger" he said flowed from the court of
appeals' view of what due process required. 7 7 Justice Souter's usage of the court of
appeals' ruling is perhaps less surprising when we realize that the Supreme Court was
vacating and remanding, with further proceedings still to occur. However, we must
remember that in many other cases in which the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court, there is little mention of what the lower court had said, nor have the justices'
opinions "played off' the lower court opinion.
A further instance ofjustices' use of opinions from the court of appeals comes in
a 1997 Term prisoners rights case in which a prisoner had sued under Section 1983 for
loss of possessions during a prison transfer. Like the already-discussed 1993 Term
Irvine case, Crawford-El v. Britton'78 contains an extensive recitation of what
transpired in the en banc proceeding. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens first
reported "The Early Proceedings," including the court of appeals panel ruling, and then
devoted an entire separately-headed section to "The En Banc Proceeding." There he
noted that the en banc court had asked for briefs on five questions rather than only the
one issue on which the panel had sought en banc. In devoting a paragraph to each of
the five opinions in the D.C. Circuit, he observed, in a comment that illustrates how the
range of views in an en banc court can assist the Supreme Court's consideration of a
case, "The different views in those five opinions attest to the importance of both the
underlying issue and a correct understanding of the relationship between our holding
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800 (1982) and the plaintiff's burden
when his or her
179
entitlement to relief depends on proof of an improper motive."'
Once he was beyond the history of the case, most of Justice Stevens' specific
references to the lower court were straight-forward statements of what it had done, like
"the categorical rule imposed by the Court of Appeals."'' 80 However, he also said: "The
unprecedented change made by the Court of Appeals in this case ...

lacks any

common law pedigree and alters the cause of action itself in a way that undermines the
very purpose of §1983," and on a point about developing new rules about discovering
in cases requiring proof of motive, he noted Judge Silberman' s concurring opinion. 81
The dissenters also referred to Judge Silberman' s opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that the court should discuss qualified immunity, which he said it had done: "I
would address the question directly, and conclude, along the lines suggested by Judge
Silberman below...," and Justice Scalia made the reference, "As described in detail
by the concurring opinion of Judge Silberman in this case"; said his "preference is, in
undiluted form, the approach suggested by Judge Silberman' s concurring opinion in
the-Court of Appeals"; and also noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist' s opinion, with its
test "'along the lines suggested by Judge8Silberman'
. .. differs in a significant respect"
2

from the one adopted by the majority.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 270.
523 U.S. 574 (1998).
Id. at 581-84.
Id. at 601.

181. Id. at 594-95.

182. Id. at 602 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 611-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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2. Dissentsfrom Denials of RehearingEn Banc
The Supreme Court seldom makes more than very brief and succinct mention of
dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, and at times, the fact is not mentioned at all
or is mentioned incompletely. 8 3There are numerous examples of brief mentions of the
fact that such dissents were filed. Typical is the particularly brief observation, "Over
two dissents, the Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing" or the terse "A
petition for rehearing was denied, with six judges dissenting."' 8 4 Similar was the
observation in a case on appellate review of certificates of appealability, "When the
Court of Appeals denied Hohn' s rehearing petition and a suggestion for rehearing en
banc, fourjudges noted they would have granted the suggestion." 15 There, the panel
dissenter's views received more space (two sentences). The same was true the
following term in a case in which, at the end of a long sentence about the panel dissent,
there was the following, relegated to a footnote: "The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en
banc, with Judge Smith, joined by five other Circuit Judges, dissenting."' 8 6 The
attention to Judge Smith may have resulted from the fact the Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, in effect adopting thejudge's position even though there was no
further reference to it. Reference to a dissent from denial of rehearing was also placed
in a footnote in Clinton v. Jones.'87
Slightly longer, perhaps because the justices adopted the position sought by the
dissenters below, was a comment in a 1994 Term case. There Justice Ginsburg
recorded, "Four judges dissented from the failure of the court to grant rehearing en
banc. The dissenters maintained that the panel had not accorded due deference to the
Comptroller's reasonable statutory interpretations," and appended a footnote
indicating, "The dissenters also observed that 6 of the court's 13 active judges were
disqualified from participating in the case,"' 188 which perhaps suggested that had all
participated, the result would have been different. By reversing the Fifth Circuit panel
here, the Supreme Court did achieve the result that those seeking en banc might have
been wishing to obtain. Also longer was the paragraph in an ERISA preemption case,
where, following a paragraph about the divided panel's disposition, the views of the

183. An example in which adissent from denial of rehearing en banc (joined by sevenjudges) is not noted in the
Supreme Court opinion is U.S. v. $405,089.23, from the Ninth Circuit, decided along with U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267
(1996). The denial of rehearing, with the dissent, is at 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995).
See also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995), where the Supreme Court opinion notes that
rehearing en banc was denied "by a vote of six judges to five." Id. at 185. Not mentioned is that Judge Newman filed
a dissenting opinion from the en banc denial. Although the names ofthe five judges may be found at 989 F.2d 478 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), that Judge Newman was not joined in her opinion by the other four judges who had voted for en banc
rehearing helps to confirm evidence otherwise available that fewer court of appeals judges make public their wish to
rehear a case than vote in favor of en banc rehearing.
184. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,464 (1995); Melendez v. United States,
518 U.S. 120,123 (1996). See also the previously-quoted passage from Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 159 (1982), that rehearing
en banc had been denied "[olver a vigorous dissent."
185. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,240 (1998). The views ofthe panel dissenter received more attention
(t

186.
187.
suggestion
188.

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830 n.l I (1999).
520 U.S. 681 (1997); id. at 689 ("Over the dissent of Judge McMillian, the Court of Appeals denied a
for rehearing en banc.").
Nationsbank of No. Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 255 and 256 n. 1(1995).
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"Six members of the Court of Appeals [who] dissented from the failure to grant
rehearing en banc" were reported.189
Receiving far more extended treatment was the dissent from denial of rehearing
en banc in the Kansas City school desegregation case, Missouri v. Jenkins.'90 Early on,
Chief Justice Rehnquist drew from that dissent to say the "desegregation plan has been
described as the most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of
school desegregation."' 9' In describing the appellate history of the case, he devoted two
paragraphs (one very long and containing an extended quotation) to the court of
appeals panel ruling, and then two paragraphs (one also very long and containing a
quotation) to the position of the five judges who had dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc. There he spelled out their views about the case, which, given that
the Supreme Court's reversal of the Eighth Circuit panel's ruling, came closer to the
position the Supreme Court adopted. Nonetheless, the body of the Chief Justice's
opinion contained little reference to the court of appeals ruling. Both he and the
concurring justices referred primarily to the ruling of the district court, the one really
under attack, while the dissenting opinion made only brief references to the district
court and about the court of appeals affirmance of its ruling.
Another case attracts our attention because the issue raised by the dissenters from
denial of en banc rehearing became the basis for certiorari in Schlup v. Delo, 192 a
federal habeas capital case in which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Eighth Circuit panel's ruling on the standard for "miscarriage of justice." Justice
Stevens, after giving particular attention to Judge Heaney's dissent from two panel
rulings in the case, stated that three judges who dissented from the denial of en banc
rehearing "joined an opinion describing the question whether the majority should have
applied the standard announced in Sawyer v. Whitley... rather than the Kuhlmann
standard as 'a question of great importance in habeas corpus jurisprudence.' ... We
granted certiorari to consider that question."' 93 Also making this case of interest is that
the Supreme Court dissenters, for whom the Chief Justice spoke, referred to a lack of
a request for en banc rehearing to support their position; he said that earlier, "Petitioner
sought review of the panel's decision [denying relief] by the en banc court. No Eighth
Circuitjudge questioned
the panel's conclusion that petitioner's trial counsel provided
' 94
effective assistance."'
The last example to be noted here United States v. Locke,' 95 is from the Ninth
Circuit, and it is important because Justice Kennedy directly if implicitly linked the
position of the dissenter from en banc denial, which he spelled out in detail, with the
statement that the Supreme Court was reversing the lower court. After reporting the
position of the court of appeals panel, he then reported the position of Judge Graber,
the lone dissenter from the rehearing denial. Immediately after reporting her argument

189. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 838-39 (1997).
190. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).

191. Id. at 78.
192. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
193. Id. at 313.
194. Id. at 336. They also mentioned the subsequent Eighth Circuit panel ruling, but not thejudges dissenting
from the en banc rehearing denial.

195. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
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"that the opinion was 'incorrect in two exceptionally important respects,"' which he
then specified, he wrote, "We granted certiorari and now reverse."' 96
V. THE SUPREME

COURT AND NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANCS

A. Treatment Overall
In the thirty Terms from 1969-1998, the Supreme Court reviewed 530 cases from
the Ninth Circuit. Of these, only twenty-four were en banc rulings; in three additional
Ninth Circuit en banc rulings, the justices GVR'd (granted certiorari, vacated and
remanded) for consideration in light of an intervening Supreme Court ruling. Twentyfour cases decided in only sixteen terms is not a large number for a three-decade
period, and for any given Supreme Court term, the numbers are very small: in each of
eleven terms, one en banc was reviewed, although in four terms, the justices reviewed
two Ninth Circuit en bancs, and in one term, it reviewed three. Cases in which the
Ninth Circuit had denied en banc rehearing over published dissent were reviewed in
eight terms, in six of which the justices also reviewed Ninth Circuit en banc
dispositions.
Of the twenty-four en banc rulings resulting in Supreme Court rulings on the
merits, the Supreme Court affirmed nine in their entirety (37.5 %), affirming in part and
reversing in part in two others. 197 There are, however, important differences in these
dispositions over time. All but one of the full affirmances of en banc rulings took place
by the end of the 1984 Term; in O.T. 1995, the justices reversed all three en banc
dispositions reviewed. A quick comparison with those circuits which had more than ten
en banc cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 1969-1998 Terms shows that Ninth
Circuit en bancs were affirmed at a lower rate than all but one of those six circuits. The
court of appeals which did best when it sat en banc was the Fourth Circuit, with a 55
percent affirmance rate. It was followed by the Fifth Circuit, with just under half
(48.5%) of its en bancs affirmed. The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all had
affirmance rates in the mid-40 percent range (45.0%, 46.9%, and 44.4%, respectively).
Of these courts from which the justices took more than a few en bancs, only the D.C.
Circuit fared less well than the Ninth Circuit, with only slightly over one-fifth (21.4%)
of its en banc rulings sustained.
B. Mention in Supreme Court Opinions
The pattern of Supreme Court treatment of Ninth Circuit en banc rulings and
dissents from denials of rehearing en banc is not unlike that for all the circuits, as
discussed above. However, a number of Ninth Circuit en banc rulings received among
the more extended treatments one finds in Supreme Court opinions, particularly in
more recent years. This may be explained in part by the subject matter (a capital case;

196. Id. at 98-99.
197. Hellman's study of 1994-1998 shows that in all but one of six reversed en bancs, the en banc had reversed
the panel in whole or substantial part, so the panel got it right. Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 441.
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federal habeas; other important criminal procedure issues in a case involving the
conviction of a federal judge). It may also reflect or be reinforced by what some
perceive to be the Supreme Court's animosity in recent years toward the Ninth Circuit,
and in particular the purported activism of some of its judges.
1. En Bancs
A look at Supreme Court treatment of Ninth Circuit en banc rulings in recent years
shows that, while the length of the basic recitation of the en banc court's action may
vary, many en banc Ninth Circuit rulings are used in the body of the Supreme Court's
opinion to a moderate or greater extent.'9 8 If we look first at action in the Ninth Circuit,
we can see better the linkage between what transpires in the lower court and the
justices' actions even if the former is not extensively discussed in the justices'
opinions.
We start with United States v. Gaudin,'99 which dealt with the materiality of false
statements. This case provides an instance in which the Ninth Circuit was urged by
some of its members to rehear a case en banc, in part to save the Supreme Court the
need to act. The court did rehear the case en banc, with the en banc majority taking the
same position as the panel, and the Supreme Court then affirmed the en banc court.2 °°
The three-j udge panel, in an opinion by Judge Hug which Judges Wallace and Rymer
joined, had ruled that the district judge's determination that certain false statements
were material as a matter of law was not harmless error. Among matters raised in
discussion of whether to rehear en banc was an alleged intercircuit conflict in which
the Ninth Circuit was on the numerical short end and a claim that the Supreme Court
had made "materiality" a matter of law. En banc hearing should take place, it was
urged, so the court could overrule earlier Ninth Circuit case law "and bring our law in
line with that of every other circuit, the [Supreme Court], our own precedent in
analogous areas, and common sense."
Once the court voted to rehear the case en banc, the result was a 6-5 majority with
Judge Hug again writing to reiterate the view that it was plain error for the trial judge
to withdraw the issue of materiality from the jury; this time Judges Wallace and Rymer
joined the dissenters, for whom Judge Kozinski wrote. He pointed out that other
circuits had not been convinced by the Ninth Circuit's earlier ruling on this issue and
that the en banc majority was both causing further intercircuit conflict and declining
to follow the Supreme Court. Indeed, he claimed,

198. There are also examples from earlier years. Some are provided by a series ofborder search cases, a number
of which the Ninth Circuit heard en banc before they went to thejustices. See, for example, UnitedStates v. Peltier,422
U.S. 531 (1975) (on retroactivity ofAlmeida-Sanchez v. UnitedStates, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), in which Justice Rehnquist
noted the Ninth Circuit en banc and described both the majority and dissenting positions at some length. Justice Brennan,
dissenting, at 546 n.3, devoted attention to Judge Browning's dissent from the Almeida-Sanchez en banc. (Supreme
Court review of that case did not occur until after the search at issue in Peltier). See also United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1985), and Bowen v. UnitedStates, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), argued and decided together in the
Supreme Court, both of which had been heard en banc in the Ninth Circuit.
199. 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993).
200. 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), afrfd, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
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Court of appeals opinions, particularly en banc opinions, frequently raise
waves on the waters of the law. Today's opinion is more akin to a tsunami. It's
not every day, after all, that we provoke a conflict with every other regional
circuit, defy Supreme Court authority, implicitly overrule several lines of our
own case law.., and pave the way for successful habeas petitions for scores,
perhaps hundreds, of prisoners convicted of a broad range of federal crimes.2 '
This peroration, an example of what some call a "Kozinski cert petition," may have
helped win Supreme Court review for the Ninth Circuit ruling, but it ultimately did not
persuade a majority of the justices. In the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Ninth
Circuit en banc decision, after a short statement in the case history, there is no further
mention of the case in the majority opinion. The outcome was somewhat ironic in that
those who had sought en banc rehearing to overturn the panel's decision instead had
that ruling ensconced as nation-wide precedent which displaced other circuits'
doctrine.
In a brief paragraph, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted the panel holding,
based on circuit precedent, "that materiality in a §1001 prosecution be decided by a
jury." He then stated, "On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals stood by the
precedent. It held that taking the question of materiality from the jury denied
respondent a right guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."2 °2 While he made
no further reference to the lower court's opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring,
did. In discussing government concessions in the case, he first noted, "The Government
also has not challenged the Court of Appeals' determination that the error it identified
was structural and plain." Then, in his concluding paragraph, in arguing with the
majority, he referred both to the Ninth Circuit's holding and to the dissent there. Citing
Judge Kozinski's dissent, he said, "Before today, every Court of Appeals that has
considered the issue, except for the Ninth Circuit, has held that the question of
materiality is one of law," so that "it is certainly subject to dispute whether the error
in this case was 'clear under current law." 20 3 He ended by noting that his colleagues
did "not review the Court of Appeals' determination that
the failure to submit the issue
2
of materiality to the jury constituted 'plain error.' 04
United States v.Aguilar,from the same term, presented a more complex situation.
It involved difficult questions of law stemming from the charges against Judge Robert
Aguilar (N.D. Cal.) for disclosing wiretap information and endeavoring to obstruct
justice. In this instance, the justices upheld the Ninth Circuit' sen banc decision on one
issue while overturning it on the other, with the result was that the panel disposition on
both matters stood. By separate 2-1 votes with different judges dissenting, a Ninth
Circuit panel had affirmed the wiretap conviction while reversing the obstruction
conviction. Taking the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit then held that both convictions
should be reversed. After reporting that action in a paragraph noting the en banc court's
various holdings, Chief Justice Rehnquist for a 6-3 court made considerable use of the
201.
202.
203.
204.

Gaudin, 28 F.3d at 964 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509 (1995).
id. at 527 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
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en banc opinion in overturning its ruling on the wiretap issue, but affirming, this time
for an 8-1 majority, the reversal of the obstruction charge."0 5 At the core of the portion
of his opinion dealing with the wiretap issue, the Chief Justice reported at some length
the issues on which the en banc court had ruled and its reasoning, only to reject it; the
lower court's view, which he had taken a paragraph to state, "fails in the face of the
statutory language itself," he said.20 6
In United States v. Armstrong, a case on selective prosecution claims from the
1995 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist followed his short initial statement about the en
banc ruling with limited later use of it. He first reported the holding of the divided
panel and then said, "The Court of Appeals voted to hear the case en banc, and the en
banc panel affirmed the District Court's order of dismissal, holding that 'a defendant
is not required to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecutor others who
are similarly situated'." He added only that "Neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals mentioned Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which by its terms
governs discovery in criminal cases. ' 2' °7
He returned to the court of appeals ruling only in the last paragraphs of his opinion
to state what the Ninth Circuit had held and to criticize that holding. After stating the
court of appeals' position "that a defendant may establish a colorable basis for
discriminatory effect without evidence that the Government has failed to prosecute
others who are similarly situated to the defendant," he asserted, "We think it was
mistaken in this view," and noted that the "vast majority" of courts of appeals require
some evidence about nonprosecution of some who could have been prosecuted, a
requirement that "is consistent with our equal protection case law." He supported this
claim by quoting from the Ninth Circuit panel whose position the en banc ruling had
overturned. 2 08 He then stated a presumption that in part provided the foundation for the
en banc ruling, only to criticize the court of appeals for citing "no authority for this
proposition, which seems contradicted by the most recent statistics of the United States
Sentencing Commission." He went on to state that "all of its sister Circuits that have
confronted the issue" had taken a different position about evidence required, thus
undercutting the concern he' said
the en banc court had stated about the "'evidentiary
29
obstacles defendants face. ' 0
While justices writing separate opinions often focus their writing on what the
Supreme Court majority has said instead of referring to the lower court opinion, in his
Armstrong dissent Justice Stevens referred to the concurring opinion below. While
agreeing with the Supreme Court majority that the facts given to the district court did
not prove the selective prosecution defense, he wrote, "Like Chief Judge Wallace of
the Court of Appeals .... I am persuaded that the District Judge did not abuse her
discretion when she concluded that the factual showing was sufficiently disturbing to

205. 994 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1993), rev 'denbanc, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded,515 U.S. 593 (1995).
206. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 603.
207. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996).
208. Id.at 469.
209. Id. at 470.
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require some response from the United States Attorney's Office," although he added
that the discovery order may have been "broader than necessary. '2 °
Three cases from the 1996 Term, in all of which the Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit's rulings, attract attention. The first, Californiav. Roy,2 ' which illustrates
the Supreme Court's restoring the position of the court of appeals panel through its
reversal of a Ninth Circuit en banc ruling, contained a moderately long description of
the Ninth Circuit's en banc action; that discussion was central to the justices'
disposition. A divided Ninth Circuit panel had affirmed a district court grant of habeas
relief on the basis of a state judge's error in instructing the jury. The en banc Ninth
Circuit adopted the position taken by Judge Hug in his panel dissent-that in an
instruction on aiding and abetting, it was not harmless error to omit the requirement
that a jury find that the defendant intended to encourage or facilitate the principal's
offense. In his en banc dissent, Judge Wallace devoted much of his discussion to what
he believed was the majority's misapplication of two Supreme Court decisions, in
which he said they had created an intercircuit conflict; he also argued that the majority
should not have looked to a concurrence by Justice Scalia in another case.2t 2
With Justice Scalia adding a separate concurrence, the Supreme Court reversed in
a unanimous per curiam ruling holding that a federal habeas court reviewing a jury
instruction of the type involved in this case was to use a harmless error standard. A
somewhat lengthy paragraph was devoted to the en banc holding. The Court said,
"[T]he majority applied a special 'harmless error' standard, which it believed combined
aspects" of two Supreme Court decisions and quoted the standard and a rephrasing to
indicate what thejustices thought it meant in context. Then, as part of an opinion that
was barely two full Supreme CourtReporterpages long, came the observation, "We
believe that the State, and the dissenting judges in the Ninth Circuit, are correct about
the proper standard." Noting that "[t]he Ninth Circuit majority drew its special standard
primarily from a concurring opinion in Carella," the justices said that there were
subsequent Supreme Court rulings bearing on the question and that their "harmless
error" standard from 1993 and 1995 cases was to be applied. While acknowledging that
the Ninth Circuit position did conform with the Carellaconcurrence, the opinion said
that the lower court's analysis "does not, in our view, overcome the holding of Brecht,
followed in O'Neal," so that the standard from those cases "should apply to the 'trial
error' before us as enunciated in those opinions and without the Ninth Circuit's
modification. 213
In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia also mentioned the Ninth Circuit opinion,
which he did not understand "to address the question of what constitutes the
harmlessness to which this more deferential standard is applied- and on that point the

210. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He added that "the District Judge [Consuelo Bland Marshall], who has
sat both on the federal and the state benches in Los Angeles, acted well within her discretion to call for the development
of facts that would demonstrate what standards, if any, governed the choice of forum where similarly situated offenders
are prosecuted." Id. at 480.
211. Roy v. Gomez, 55 F.3d 1483 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded en banc, 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd sub nom., California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996).
212. The allegedly misapplied cases were Brecht v.Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), and O 'Neal v. McAninch,
513 U.S. 532 (1995). Scalia's concurrence was in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
213. Roy, 519 U.S. at 6.
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Ninth Circuit was quite correct. ' , 2 14 However, because the Ninth Circuit had not applied
the "more deferential standard" he agreed was the correct one, he concurred in the
remand so that the lower court could make a determination different from the one it did
make. He also cited another part of the Ninth Circuit opinion in which "the Ninth
Circuit purported to be applying the O'Neal standard. 2 15
In the second 1996 Term case, both the Ninth Circuit panel and the en banc court
had invalidated Arizona's English-as-official-language statute. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion vacating and remanding for a unanimous Court contains a succinct but
long-almost seven-page-statement of the case's history, both before it reached the
en banc stage and the en banc action itself. Calling attention to obvious indicia of
mootness because of the absence of the original plaintiff, Justice Ginsburg said "The
Ninth Circuit had no warrant to proceed as it did" and the case "should not have been
retained for adjudication on the merits by the Court of Appeals. 216 Explicating the
reasons for this conclusion, she drew heavily on what the Ninth Circuit-particularly
the panel, but also the en banc court-said. At times she referred to the en banc ruling,
at times to the panel, and at times to both, as she moved to her statement, toward the
opinion's end, that "A more cautious approach was in order" 217 and that the Ninth
Circuit should have given "more respectful consideration" to the requests that the case
be certified to the Arizona courts. 1 8
The third case was the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit en banc
ruling affirming the district court's invalidation of Washington's statutory ban on
assisted suicide. In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist recited
court of appeals action in one long paragraph, also appending a footnote spelling out
more of what the en banc court had said. The en banc court, he said, like the district
court, had "emphasized our Casey and Cruzan decisions," had discussed attitudes
toward assisted suicide, and had found "a due process liberty interest in controlling the
time and manner of one's death" which had led to its conclusion that the state's ban
"was unconstitutional 'as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten
21 9
their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.'
He further noted that the en banc court had not dealt with the district court's ruling
based on the Equal Protection Clause, the basis for the Second Circuit decision on
which the Supreme Court ruled simultaneously.220 He did, however, acknowledge that
the Ninth Circuit had indicated the argument had weight and had "sharply criticized"
a district court ruling, pending on appeal, that had found an equal protection violation
in the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. 22' After this recitation, the Chief Justice made
much use of the Ninth Circuit en banc opinion throughout his own opinion, first by
stating what the court of appeals had said, then by commenting on it and stating the

214. id. at 6 (Scalia, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
216. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,48 (1997). Later she referred to "the unwarranted
en banc Court of Appeals judgment." Id. at 73.
217. Id. at 77.
218. id. at 78.

219. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 709 n.6 (1997).
220. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
221. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709 n.7.
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Supreme Court's views. In so doing, he more than once mentioned Judge Beezer's
dissent, but his principal focus was on the law rather than on criticizing the Ninth
Circuit's particular reading of it. This focus was perhaps a result of the fact the Court
was also reviewing the Second Circuit's ruling, based on equal protection, which had
reached the same result as the Ninth Circuit.
Calderon v. Thompson,222 which came a term later, is especially important for
consideration here because the en banc process itself was at the core of the case and the
opinions in the Supreme Court, particularly Justice Souter's dissent, spoke to that
process. The 5-4 division of the justices and their strong reaction to the Ninth Circuit
is explained in large measure by the fact that this was a capital case in which the en
banc court not only granted habeas relief but did so through what appeared to be
irregular operation of its own procedures when it recalled the mandate issued by a
three-judge panel. The justices' action in turn helps explain why Judge Reinhardt later
delivered an impassioned lecture about the case.223
The "lengthy procedural history of the case, 22 4 including both state and federal
proceedings, consumed close to five Supreme Court Reporter pages in Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court. He noted that after the Ninth Circuit panel had
reversed the district court grant of habeas relief, an initial suggestion for rehearing en
banc did not prompt any of the Ninth Circuit's judges to request an en banc vote, and
the mandate in the case then issued. Then, shortly before the scheduled execution date,
the defendant asked the court of appeals to recall its mandate. After an initial denial,
"the full court voted to consider en banc whether to recall its earlier mandate" to
prevent "a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice," and the en banc court then recalled the
mandate. Four judges dissented in three different opinions, and of these, Justice
Kennedy relied most heavily on that by Judge Kozinski, who had clerked for Judge
Kennedy in the Ninth Circuit. As Justice Kennedy described it, the Kozinski dissent
"detailed the circumstances which led the majority to find its en banc process had
malfunctioned"2 5and claimed that "the court's en banc process 'operated just as it's
supposed to.,,

What made the Ninth Circuit's en banc activity problematic were the
"extraordinary circumstances" offered for the recall of the mandate-"procedural
misunderstandings" by some of the appeals courtjudges.226 Two judges had missed the
official window of opportunity for calling for en banc rehearing; for one, the purported
reason was failed communication during the transition from one set of law clerks to the
next, while the other had missed the panel's notice rejecting the suggestion for en banc
rehearing. Upon discovering the problem, the two judges sought an extension of the
time to seek rehearing en banc from the panel author, which he refused to grant. Only
some months later, after Thompson had received a stay of mandate to seek certiorari
and the Supreme Court had denied review, was there a sua sponte request for en banc
action to recall the mandate.

222.
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224.
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Reinhardt, supra note 62, at 313.
523 U.S. at 544.
Id. at 547, 549.
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Not surprisingly, the issues before the Supreme Court were whether recalling the
mandate violated relevant statutes and whether the order was "an abuse of the court's
discretion." For the majority, Justice Kennedy ruled for the majority that the Ninth
Circuit action had been improper, indeed, "a grave abuse of discretion., 227 "Measured
even by standards of general application," he said, "the Court of Appeals' decision to
recall the mandate rests on the most doubtful of grounds." He found a "mishandled law
clerk transition in onejudge's chambers, and the failure of anotherjudge to notice the
action proposed by the original panel" to be "the slightest of bases for setting aside the
'deep rooted policy in favor of the repose ofjudgments'." This was particularly so, he
averred, when "the only consequence.., was the failure of two judges to contribute
their views to a determination that had been given full consideration on the merits by
a panel of the court"; their delay in acting for several months after the problem surfaced
"only compounded" the lower court's error. 28 Justice Kennedy referred directly to the
Ninth Circuit's ruling throughout the remainder of his opinion. He did so particularly
in dealing with the application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA). The Act tightened the rules for federal court grants of habeas
corpus, and less so in dealing with the standard for evaluating "miscarriage ofjustice,"
where he was quite critical of the lower court in his ultimate holding that it had "abused
its discretion" by ruling that California's conviction of Thompson and sentence of
death resulted in such a miscarriage.229
For the dissenters, Justice Souter also wrote at length about the Ninth Circuit' sen
bane action. He first agreed with the majority that the en bane action was sua sponte,
not the result of a party's suggestion. Because of the delay before the en bane action
took place, the Ninth Circuit's timing was "a matter for regret" and "unfortunate," he
said, "[e]ven on my assumption that the Court of Appeals acted on its own and in the
interest of the integrity of the appellate process., 230 However, he departed from what
he felt was his colleagues' application of"a new and erroneous standard to review the
recall of the mandate., 23' Justice Souter believed that the justices owed deference to a
court of appeals that was dealing with matters of internal operation, adding, "The
obligation of deference is only underscored here by the fact that the reason for the
recall was to consider an en banc rehearing, a matter of administration232for the Court of
Appeals on which this Court has been careful to avoid intrusion.
Justice Souter devoted particular attention to two aspects of the Ninth Circuit' s en
bane action. One was whether an en banc court ought to be used "to correct a panel's
error in the application of settled law"; citing Judge Kozinski' s dissent, he thought this
was "the only serious question raised about the validity" of the Ninth Circuit's "stated
justification" of acting "to exercise extreme care to counter the malfunction of its own
procedural mechanisms where the result otherwise might well be a constitutionally
erroneous imposition of the death penalty." He felt that, "however true it is that the en
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bane rehearing process cannot effectively function to review every three-judge panel
that arguably goes astray in a particular case, surely it is nonetheless reasonable to
resort to en banc correction that may be necessary to avoid a constitutional error
standing between a life sentence and an execution.' 233
On the other point, whether a miscarriage ofjustice resulted from the two judges
having missed their chance to call for and vote on whether to have en bane review,
Justice Souter showed particular understanding of the realities of interactions in a
multi-judge court. Although he said that "two failures to vote for en bane review are
not the cause of a miscarriage when the vote against such review is otherwise
unanimous," the importance of the possibility that judges might influence each
other-what we might call the "group dynamics" in such a court-put the matter in a
different light. He wrote, "[A]nyone who has ever sat on a bench with other judges
knows that judges are supposed to influence each other, and they do. One may see
something the others did not see, and then they all take another look." As a result, "it
was reasonable here for the en banc court to believe that when only two judges
mistakenly failed to vote for en bane rehearing, their misunderstandings could well
have affected the result., 23 4 Beyond that, Justice Souter dealt with the question of
whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel was an abuse of
discretion. "Whether the en bane majority was correct on this question of law and fact
is not the issue here," he said; instead it was "simply whether those voting to recall the
mandate to allow en bane review could reasonably have thought the earlier panel had
been mistaken," a point on which he felt "the conclusions of the District Court suffice
to answer yes to that question. ,,211
These examples show that the Supreme Court can draw more than trivially on en
bane opinions. Particularly when thejustices have urged the courts of appeals to sit en
banc, one might expect the Supreme Court to discuss an en bane court's opinions at
some length, yet, as we have seen, seldom does this take place. The Court's failure to
do so can, however, meet with implicit criticism. One such instance was Continental
TV v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., an antitrust case, where the majority had set forth the en
bane majority's position and in a note had described the two dissents from it, and, in
another note, had disagreed with Judge Browning's dissent.236 Justice White,
concurring in thejudgment, wrote, "In two short paragraphs, the majority disposes of
the view, adopted after careful analysis by the Ninth Circuit en bane below, that these
differences provide a 'principled basis for distinguishing Schwinn'."237 Justice Powell,
for the Court disagreed with Justice White over the latter's attempt to distinguish the
Schwinn case.238

233. Id. at 568-69.
234. Id. at 570.
235. Id. at 570-71.

236. Id. at42 n.10, 53 n.21.
237. 433 U.S. at 60 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment). He added "The majority apparently gives no weight to
the Court of Appeals' reliance on the difference between the Sylvania and Schwinn situations. Id. at 63.
238. Id. at42 n.10, 53 n.21.
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2. Dissentsfrom En Banc Denials
In its opinions, the Supreme Court's treatment of dissents from denials of rehearing
en banc in the Ninth Circuit is like that given such opinions from other circuits.
Representative of terse reporting is Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee: "The Attorney General's petition for rehearing en banc was denied over
the dissent of three judges. '239 Likewise, in UnitedStates v. Koon,240 on the Guidelines
sentencing of the police officers charged with beating Rodney King, Justice Kennedy's
very brief comment about the en banc denial came in his very first paragraph-"The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's departure rulings,
and, over the published objection of nine of its judges, declined to hear the case en
banc" 241-and he made no further reference to that dissent, even after his extended
treatment of the panel ruling in reciting the history of the case and even though he drew
repeatedly on the panel opinion in discussing the law.
In this case, after the Ninth Circuit panel had upheld the convictions but not the
sentences, a call for rehearing en banc was made and denied.242 For the dissenters,
Judge Reinhardt argued that the law with respect to departures from Guidelines
sentences should be clarified and issued what amounted to a plea to the Supreme Court
to take the case for that purpose: "[T]he Supreme Court may yet provide Judge Davies
with the guidance that our own court has refused to offer ...perhaps the Supreme
Court will deem it important to clarify the extent of the authority that sentencing judges
possess to depart downwardly from the Guidelines. 2 4 3 In affirming in part, reversing
in part and remanding, ruling that for the most part, the district judge had acted
properly within his discretion, the justices did provide the guidance for which Judge
Reinhardt had called.
Somewhat longer treatment was given to the dissent from denial of en banc
rehearing in NationalEndowmentfor the Arts v. Finley,244 the challenge to the statutory
requirement that applications for NEA grants be reviewed in terms of "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public." A divided Ninth Circuit panel had affirmed the district court's invalidation of
the provision. However, Judge Kleinfeld had asserted in dissent, "Our decision today
creates a conflict with the only other circuits to have confronted a similar issue," and
had observed in response to a comment by the majority that it had unsatisfactorily tried
to distinguish two circuits' cases because of their timing in relation to a recent Supreme
Court decision.245 When en banc rehearing was denied, threejudges, including Judge
Kleinfeld, dissented. They argued in part, "The majority's opinion does far more than
give a hostile construction to a Congressional enactment in order to create
a conflict
246
with other circuits and Supreme Court precedent, and overturn a law.,'

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999).
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
Id. at 85.
45 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1308 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
424 U.S. 569 (1998).
100 F.3d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
113 F.3d 1015, 1016 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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Over only one dissent, the Supreme Court agreed with the three judges and
reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding neither a facial violation of the First Amendment
violation nor unconstitutional statutory vagueness. 2 47 After a long paragraph about the
panel majority and a paragraph on Judge Kleinfeld's dissent in the panel, Justice
O'Connor observed, "Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc,
maintaining that the panel's decision gave the statute an 'implausible construction,'
applied the "'void for vagueness"' doctrine where it does not belong,' and extended
248
'First Amendment principles to a situation that the First Amendment doesn't cover.'
Despite the fact that the majority agreed with the position of those dissenters, neither
Justice O'Connor nor Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, made further mention
of the dissenters' views. Here, the stance of those calling for en banc had been
legitimated, for had the court of appeals gone en banc and reversed the panel, the result
would have been what the Supreme Court did decide. Such a situation, where the court
of appeals denied en banc rehearing over a published dissent, with the Supreme Court
then reversing the panel, indicates in retrospect that there was somejustification for the
court of appeals to have heard the case en banc.
VI. EN BANC V. PANEL
A. Overall: All Circuits
At long last, we look at how the Supreme Court treated court of appeals en banc
dispositions compared to its disposition of rulings by three-judge panels. One might
expect that certiorari would be sought in a higher proportion of en banc decisions than
of rulings by three-judge panels, and that review would be granted in a higher
proportion of en banc than panel dispositions, although both proportions would be
quite low.2 49 However, the rate at which the Supreme Court grants certiorari in cases
heard en banc and possible reasons for grants and denials of review are beyond the
scope of this article. Restricting attention to the cases accepted for review can be
justified on the ground that lower court judges and lawyers, although interested in
particular cases in which review has been declined, will pay closer attention to what
the Supreme Court does when it decides en banc and panel dispositions on the merits
than to proportions of cases in which certiorari has not been sought or, if sought, not
granted.

247. 424 U.S. 569 (1998).
248. Id. at 530.
249. The leading treatment of the justices' consideration of factors used in granting certiorari, H.W. Perry, Jr.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETrING INTHE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991), fails to discuss whether en
banc rulings provide a "signal" used by the Supreme Court, so the assertion here is speculative.
In 1991-1998, certiorari was sought from half of the Ninth Circuit's en banc rulings, and 10 of 48 petitions were
granted. When ajudge called foren banc rehearing but such rehearing did not occur, the losing party filed for certiorari
in 63 of 102 cases, with 9 of the 63 petitions granted. In the more than 150 cases in which judges circulated memoranda
about a panel disposition but there was no en banc vote, certiorari was sought in 60 and was granted in only six of those
cases. All of these proportions are far higher than the Court's overall "grant" rate. See Getting It Right, supra note 3,
at 441, 445.
Hellman also presents data for 1994-1998 on whether there was a request for en banc rehearing, either by the
parties or from within the court, in cases the Supreme Court reversed.
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In examining Supreme Court treatment of en banc and panel dispositions, we
should keep in mind that the number of en banc rulings actually reviewed may be
understated because in some instances where the Supreme Court reviews a panel
disposition, the court of appeals may have rendered an en banc decision at a still earlier
stage of the case, perhaps returning the case to the panel after an en banc decision. To
such situations, one must add those in which a panel followed circuit precedent stated
earlier by an en banc court. In all these situations, even if the case immediately before
the justices was decided by a panel, de facto the Supreme Court's review is of the court
of appeals en banc ruling.
Arkansas Education Television Commission v. Forbes,5 ° on participation in
presidential debates, provides an example. An Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction, after which the district court dismissed for failure to
state a claim and an en banc court, proceeding without a panel ruling, affirmed on
Forbes' statutory claim and reversed on the First Amendment question. On remand,
when the district court again decided against Forbes, an Eighth Circuit panel reversed
and remanded, and it was that ruling the Supreme Court reversed. l
Ninth Circuit cases the Supreme Court reviewed also reveal a number of such
situations. For example, in the long-running case of United States v. Loud Hawk,252 the
panel determination the Supreme Court reversed in 1986 was preceded by a 1981 en
banc disposition.5 3 In Washingtonv. ConfederatedBands and Tribes of Yakima Indian
Nation254 in the 1978 Term, the Supreme Court reviewed a panel disposition which had
followed an en banc ruling, and Supreme Court reversal of the panel had the effect of
sustaining the en banc court's position. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,2 5 an
affirmative action ruling, was a review of a panel decision, but an en banc court had
returned the case to that panel, and the same Ninth Circuit judge wrote for both the
panel and the en banc court.256 And in the same term as Wards Cove, the justices also
decided United States v. Zolin,257 in which the Ninth Circuit had granted en banc
review but the divided en banc had vacated the en banc rehearing, returning the case
to the panel.
In one instance, in which the Ninth Circuit had upheld a grant of federal habeas as
to a death sentence (although not as to the underlying conviction), the court of appeals'
reliance on an earlier en banc surfaced in the Supreme Court's per curiam reversal of
the Ninth Circuit decision.258 Justice Stevens noted, for the dissenters, that the Ninth
Circuit panel, "Instead of spelling out its reasoning at length, ...
merely cited an earlier
en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit that came to a similar conclusion." In a footnote,
he pointed out that the Supreme Court majority, which had made no mention of the en
banc, "inadvertently omits the citation" to the en banc "that explained the Court of

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

523 U.S. 666 (1998).
Id.
474 U.S. 302 (1986).
Id. United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1981).
439 U.S. 463 (1979).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Id.
491 U.S. 554 (1989).
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).
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Appeals' reasoning," and then he went on to quote the en banc court ruling, as well as
to note four judges' dissent from it.259
Again we examine three decades of Supreme Court rulings. In the most recent tenyear period under study (O.T. 1989-1998), the courts of appeals en banc dispositions
fared worse than did their panels' rulings. (See Tables I and IA.) The Supreme Court
affirmed only slightly over one-fourth (26.8%) of reviewed en banc dispositions while
affirming over one-third (35.4%) of panel rulings. In this period, there were, however,
three terms when en bancs did better: 1991, 1992, and 1994, with half the en banc
cases reviewed being affirmed but less than 40 percent of panel rulings being upheld
in 1991 and 1994. (In the 1999 Term, the two en bancs reviewed by the justices were
affirmed, while roughly one-third [34.5%] of court of appeals panel rulings were
upheld.) However, some terms saw almost all en bancs reversed or vacated-such as
1995 (only 1 of 6 affirmed), 1996 (2 of 11), and 1998 (1 of 7). (In the 1999 Term,
because thejustices affirmed the two en bancs they reviewed, those rulings fared better
than did panel rulings, slightly over one-third of which (34.5%) were affirmed, and in
O.T. 2000, the proportion of panel dispositions and en banc rulings was roughly the
same, with the former slightly high-36.7 percent as against 33.3 percent).
The picture in the 1979-1988 Terms is quite different. In that time, the court of
appeals en banc rulings fared much better in the Supreme Court than did its panel
dispositions, as a majority (52.2%) of reviewed en banc rulings were affirmed while
only one-third of the panel dispositions (34.4%) were upheld. The en bancs did better
than the panel rulings in all but the 1988 term (45.5 percent of en bancs and 47 percent
of panels upheld, only a small difference), and in some terms, the en bancs did far
better than panel rulings. For example, in the 1982 Term, 62.5 percent of en bancs but
only 34.5 percent of panel rulings were upheld, with roughly similar proportions in the
1985 Term (62.5% v. 37.5%). And in the 1987 Term, 80 percent of en bancs were
upheld while less than one-third (32.1%) of panel dispositions were upheld.
In the earliest of the three decades under study (O.T. 1969-O.T. 1978), the courts
of appeals' en banc rulings also fared better than rulings from panels, although the
difference was not as great as in the ten years to follow: of the en bancs, 38.3 percent
of the en bancs were affirmed, as were less than one-third (31.9%) of panel rulings.
Within the decade, however, there was variation across the terms; this is partly
explained by the small numbers of en bancs in some years (only two in several terms).
En bancs did better than panels in four terms, including 1975 and 1976, with five of
eight en bancs but only one-fourth (26.1%) of panels affirmed in 1975. Panels were
upheld at a rate higher than were en bancs in four other terms, and the proportions were
roughly the same in the remaining two.

259. 525 U.S. at 150-51 n.4 (1998). The en banc is McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1003 (1998).
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1. En Banc in Relation to Panel
While it is important to learn the Supreme Court's disposition of en banc rulings
in order to cast more light on whether it is worth while for the court of appeals to hear
or rehear a case en banc, we must determine whether en banc judgments were identical
to, or at odds with, those of the panels whose opinions they displaced.26 ° If the lower
court has heard the case en banc and has overturned the panel, and the Supreme Court
has in turn reversed the lower court, one might ask whether there was any point in the
lower court rehearing the case en banc. This is particularly true where the Supreme
Court majority draws on the en banc dissenters-although here one could say that they
provided the justices with a ready-made formulation for their position.
Before continuing, we must comment that dealing with data about en banc courts
in relation to panel dispositions requires care because the apparent absence of a panel
opinion does not mean there was none. There are situations when the court of appeals
moves directly to en banc consideration before a panel rules, and there are cases in
which the court makes clear that en banc hearing was granted before a panel
disposition. That was certainly more likely in the earlier years, as holding en banc
sittings was easier when the court had only thirteen judges, and Hellman's data
supports the existence of such cases.26' In addition to instances in which the en banc
court says nothing about whether or not there was a panel -after reporting the district
court's action, the author simply states the issues and proceeds to deal with them-it
is clear from some en bane opinions that a panel existed but its disposition never was
published, or if published in the Advance Sheets, it was withdrawn from the bound
volume when the court vacated it on deciding to rehear the case en banc. Because
courts of appeals decided fewer cases in the earlier years of this study, there were more
en banc rulings without an evident panel disposition then because it took longer to fill
a FederalReporter volume.
Ajudge recalls that in the early 1970s, the court's consideration of whether to take
a case en bane would take place before publication of the panel disposition, and "the
panels would ordinarily telephone St. Paul [West Publishing] and put a hold on
potential en bancs so the panel would not have to see its published opinion withdrawn";
he recalled having his secretary "call West a time or two, to hold a case for possible en
bane." 262 More recently, although a smaller proportion of all court of appeals cases is
published, the high volume of these opinions results in more frequent appearance of
FederalReportervolumes, making it quite likely that the panel's disposition in a case
later taken en bane is quite likely to appear in the bound volume even if later formally
vacated.

260. For data on the extent to which en bancs reverse, sustain, or modify panel results, primarily reversing, see
Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 457 tbl.3.
261. Of seventy-seven cases accepted en banc from January 1994 to September 30,1999, nine were on the basis
of a panel request before the panel issued a decision. Getting It Right, supra note 3, at 456. For an interesting instance
of Supreme Court review of an en banc ruling not immediately preceded by a panel, see UnitedStates v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180 (1984), where a panel disposition had preceded the trial which the en banc court reviewed but that en banc

disposition, which the Supreme Court reviewed, was not immediately preceded by a panel.
262. E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, to Professor Stephen L. Wasby (Nov. 3,1999) (on file with author).
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There was an identifiable panel disposition prior to en banc court action in roughly
three times as many cases as those for which no panel disposition could be identified.
Across the full thirty-year period, the Supreme Court affirmed roughly one-third
(34.0%) of the cases where the en banc court reached the same result as the panel, with
negligible change from one decade to the next. (See Table II.) However, when the en
banc took a position opposite to the one taken by the panel, the rate at which the
justices affirmed is ten percentage points higher (44.7%).
There was, as one might expect, considerable variation across terms. In two of the
seven 1976 Term cases, there appears to have been no panel disposition before the en
banc ruling, in one of which the court of appeals sat en banc after certiorari before
judgment had been unsuccessfully sought.2 63 Of the four in which the en banc court had
reversed the panel, thejustices in turn reversed in three, in effect upholding the panel,
while thejustices affirmed when the panel and en banc reach the same result. In nine
of the 1981 Term cases (five of the affirmances and four of the others), there was no
apparent panel ruling prior to the en banc disposition. In one of the remaining
affirmances, the en banc court had overturned the panel; in the other, the en banc court
affirmed the district court by an evenly divided vote. Of the four reversals in which
there had been both panel and en banc rulings, in two, the en banc court had reversed
the panel, bringing the result "into harm's way" at the Supreme Court's hands because
a split within the lower court is a signal attracting the justice's attention, while in the
other two, including the important employment discrimination case, American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson,264 the panel and en banc had reached the same result, so that en banc
activity did not change the outcome of the case on Supreme Court review.
Of the en banc rulings reversed or vacated in the 1986 Term, in only one (along
with the "split" result) did the panel and en banc reach the same result. In the other
four, the en banc differed from the panel; in two, both the panel and en banc reversed
the district court but the en banc reached a different outcome, granting a defendant
greater relief or allowing greater use of forfeited assets.265
Table II
En Banc: Relation to Panel, by Decade
Same
Term

Aff

Differ
Other

Aff

No Panel
Other

Aff

Other

1989-1998
1979-1988
1969-1978

6
9
3

33.3%
36.0
30.0

12
16
7

66.7%
64.0
70.0

8
23
3

29.6% 121
67.6 |11
23.1
10

70.4%
32.4
76.9

3
14
12

33.3%
45.1
50.0

6
17
12

66.7%
54.9
50.0

1969-1998

18

34.0% 35

66.0%

34

44.7%

I 42

55.3%

29

45.3%

35

54.7%

263. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Territory of
Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
264. 456 U.S. 63 (1982). A Fourth Circuit panel had affirmed the district court, but the en banc court affirmed
the district court in part and vacated and remanded in part, a de facto affirmance of the district court so that the panel
and en banc in effect came out the same way.
265. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
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The picture reveals substantial change from one decade to the next. In 1969-1978,
the Supreme Court affirmed only three of thirteen (23.1%) of en bancs which had taken
a position opposite to that of the panel. However, in 1979-1988 the figure rose to an
extremely high two-thirds (67.6%), roughly twice the Court's usual overall affirmance
rate. This showing would provide support for those court of appeals judges who
disapproved of a panel ruling from their courts and sought to have the case heard en
banc to produce a different result. However, precisely the opposite outcome was found
in the 1989-1998 Terms, when thejustices affirmed only 29.6 percent of these cases,
a reversal rate providing evidence that, from a "win-loss" perspective, it did not pay
for a court of appeals to rehear panel rulings en banc even when their judges might
dislike them.
Where there was no evident panel disposition, the Supreme Court affirmed in less
than half (45.3 %) overall, with that portion decreasing over the next three decades to
only one-third in the most recent ten-year period, a rate not noticeably different from
the Court's overall affirmance rate. These outcomes do not suggest that a "pristine" en
banc will decrease the likelihood the Supreme Court will overturn it if it later reaches
the justices, although by the same light, such activity increased the chances of
affirmance only somewhat rather than substantially.
When the Supreme Court reviewed cases where the courts of appeals denied en
banc rehearing over a published dissent, in 1969-1978, the proportion of affirmances
was 25 percent, below the portion of all panel rulings affirmed and midway between
the figures for the later two decades, but the small number of cases precludes giving
the finding much weight. In the 1979-1988 decade, the Supreme Court affirmed in
roughly one-third of these cases (34.7%), almost exactly the same proportion as for all
panel rulings. However, in the 1989-1998 period, the story is quite different: only two
of these rulings (10.5 %) were affirmed, far less frequently than for all panels. Had the
dissenting judges persuaded their colleagues to rehear the cases en banc and to overturn
the panel, the outcome in the Supreme Court might well have been different.
B. The Ninth Circuit
The number of Ninth Circuit en banc cases reviewed by the Supreme Court is
small, but examination of the relative disposition of en banc and panel rulings over the
three ten-year periods from O.T. 1969-1998 reveals some interesting differences over
time. Overall, the justices affirmed 30 percent of the en banc decisions and 27.9 percent
of the three-judge panel rulings it reviewed. Thus, for the entire period, when the Ninth
Circuit sat en banc it fared slightly better than did its panels. (See Table III.)
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Table III
Ninth Circuit: En Banc v. Panel, by Decade
En banc
Term
1969-1978

6

Aff
85.7%

1979-1988

2

25.0%

1989-1998

1

1969-1998

9

I

Panel
Other
1

(n=7)
6
(n = 8)
11.1%
1 8
(n= 9)
30.0%
1 15
(n = 24)

44

Aff
32.4%

64

26.7%

36
141

Other
92

(n= 36)
1 140
(n = 204)
21.3%
1133
(n= 169)
27.9%
I 365
(n = 506)

For individual decades, however, the picture varies in important ways. In the 19691978 Terms, the Supreme Court affirmed only one-third of Ninth Circuit panel
dispositions it reviewed (32.4%), but it affirmed six ofseven en banc rulings (85.7%),
an astounding affirmance rate for any category of cases. In each of the next two
decades (1979-1988, 1989-1998), the affirmance rate for Ninth Circuit en banc
dispositions was more "normal"-well below half-and the rate decreased from one
decade to the next, paralleling a decrease in the rate at which the Supreme Court
affirmed Ninth Circuit panel rulings.
In the 1979-1988 Terms, the justices affirmed only two of eight Ninth Circuit en
bancs (25%), and in the 1989-998 Terms, it affirmed only one en banc out of nine
reviewed (11.1%). (If we count each "split" decision-affirm in part, reverse in
part-as one-half, the proportions are 31.3% and 16.7%). From having its panel rulings
affirmed at a 32.4 percent rate in the first decade under study, the rate fell to 26.7
percent for the 1979-1988 Terms and to 21.3 percent for 1989-1998. After en bancs
were affirmed far more frequently (85.7% to 32.4% for panels) in the first decade, and
in the second decade en banc and panel dispositions were upheld at roughly equal rates
(25.0% v. 26.7%), but in the third decade, en banc dispositions fared much worse than
panel rulings (11.1% to 21.3%). This last figure is grist for the mill of those who argue
that sitting en banc to assist the Supreme Court isn't worth the candle.
In four of the six terms in which thejustices reviewed more than one Ninth Circuit
en banc, en bancs received a better reception than did panels. In the 1974 Term, two
of three en bancs, but only two of nine panel rulings, were affirmed; two terms later
(1976), both en bancs were affirmed while only two of seven panel dispositions were
upheld. In both the 1980 and 1994 terms, one of two en bancs was affirmed, far better
treatment than panel rulings received (4 of 15 affirmed in 1980; 2 of 16 in 1994). In the
1983 and 1996 Terms, in both of which the Ninth Circuit fared exceptionally poorly
at thejustices' hands, none of the en bancs reviewed (two and three, respectively) were
affirmed. As the court of appeals' rulings were reversed or vacated in all but one case
in O.T. 1996, and only two cases in O.T. 1983 were affirmed in part, so the en banc
cases did not fare worse than did panel dispositions; in short, all Ninth Circuit cases did
poorly.
Also of interest are the twelve Ninth Circuit cases in which en banc rehearing was
denied with a published dissent. The most common number ofjudges dissenting was
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three, but the number ranged from two-in Cupp v. Naughten,266 where the Ninth
Circuit denied en banc by an evenly divided vote but only twojudges dissented from
the denial, and the San Francisco school desegregation case of Lau v. Nichols267 -to
seven (United States v. $405,089.23, decided with United States v. Ursery from the
Sixth Circuit 268), eight (I.N.S. v. Pangilinan269) and nine (the Koon case from the
Rodney King beating 270).
Of these twelve cases, in addition to the Koon case, which the Supreme Court
affirmed in part and reversed in part, in only one instance, the UnitedStates Olympic
Committee case 27' did the Supreme Court affirm the lower court ruling. Had the judges
who sought en banc rehearing been successful in obtaining a different result, they
likely would have been reversed. In the remaining nine cases, however, the Supreme
Court reversed or vacated, so that if the judges dissenting from en banc denial had
prevailed below, the Supreme Court might either have granted review and affirmed or
chosen not to hear the case. Nor were these unimportant cases. In addition to those
already named, they include United States v.MacCollom,272 on the availability of trial
transcripts to prisoners seeking habeas corpus; two cases on aspects of the death
penalty; NationalEndowment for the Arts v. Finley, on the "indecency" standard for
NEA awards to artists; and Reno v.American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationCommittee,
on deportation claimed to be for association with a politically unpopular group.
1. En Banc in Relation to Panel
In almost half of the twenty-four Ninth Circuit en banc cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the 1969-1998 period, there appears to have been no panel
disposition. Most but not all of these cases predated the late 1970s when statutes
increased the Ninth Circuit's complement of active judges from thirteen to twenty-three
and then to twenty-eight. Of the nine en banc rulings affirmed by the Supreme Court,
seven came from en banc rulings with no published panel disposition. In the other two
affirmances, the panel and en banc court came out pretty much the same way in one,
United States v. Gaudin,273 where the en banc court affirmed the district court in part
and reversed in part. However, in Montanav. Blackfeet Tribe ofIndians,274 the en banc
court reached a different result from the panel, so that in that instance, going en banc
did lead to what the Supreme Court later said was the correct result.
We have both panel and en banc rulings for ten of the fifteen en banc decisions the
justices reversed or vacated in whole or in part. In one of the "split outcomes," a labor
case, 275 the panel and en banc came out at roughly the same place, while in the appeal

266. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
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414 U.S. 563 (1974).
518 U.S. 267 (1996).
486 U.S. 875 (1988).
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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of Judge Aguilar's criminal conviction,276 the panel and en banc court differed.
However, in only one of the seven cases in which the Supreme Court fully overturned
the Ninth Circuit result did the panel and en banc court reach the same result-the
"English as official language" case. 277 In the others, the en banc court had reached a
result different from the panel' , so that the Supreme Court's reversal of the en banc
court in effect meant that the panel "had it right." The cases in which the en banc Ninth
Circuit adopted a position different from the panel and then was reversed by the
justices included Ricketts v.Adamson, 278 on enforceability of plea-bargains; Reno v.
Flores,279 on detaining juvenile illegal aliens; Washington v. Glucksberg,280 the assisted
suicide case; and the Calderonv. Thompson281 death penalty case. We must, however,
keep in mind that there were instances in which the justices' basis for resolving the
case was different from those the lower court used. For example, in Renne v. Geary,282
a challenge to a state ban on party endorsements for nonpartisan offices, the Supreme
Court held that the case did not present ajusticiable controversy-the same outcome
as in the "official language" ruling.
VII. CONCLUSION

When we look at how the Supreme Court treats court of appeals en banc rulings,
particularly in comparison with its treatment of panel dispositions, we find that
Supreme Court opinions show little reference either to en banc rulings or to dissents
from denials of rehearing en banc beyond reporting such action as part of the standard
procedural history of the case before the writing justice begins to deal with its legal
issues. On the whole, there is little difference in treatment given en bancs by the
Supreme Court from the treatment received by the larger number of panel rulings.
However, there is some variation: when the justices reverse or vacate a court of appeals
ruling, there may be some reference to the dissenter in the court of appeals, and, in a
limited number of instances, findings or conclusions in the lower court ruling are used
as a fulcrum against which the justices leverage their own views.
That thejustices engage in relatively little discussion of court of appeals en banc
activity does not, however, mean that such activity has no effect on them. The justices
can read the en banc dispositions themselves and dissents from denials to rehear.
Where there has been a dissent in the panel, even if there is no formal notation in the
record of en banc activity, the justices will know of some of its content because a panel
dissent is often the basis for an en banc call either by the dissenter or a colleague basing
the call on that dissent.
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276. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
277. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
278. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
279. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
280. 521 U.S. 702 (1997), rev'g Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
281. 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
282. 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
283. If, with the parties filing no petition for rehearing and/or suggestion for rehearing en banc, there had been
sua sponte en banc activity but rehearing was not granted and there was no published dissent from the denial, with no
resulting notation of that activity, the Supreme Court would not have any official action which would direct thejustices
to such activity.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
When we turn to outcomes, we find that on this record there is little evidence that
the Supreme Court, in either its outcomes or opinions, cuts the United States Courts of
Appeals much slack for having decided cases en banc. The record does suggest that in
the earlier years of this three-decade period, en banc courts were more likely to be
upheld than were panel opinions, but the more recent state of affairs is quite to the
contrary. Indeed, in some recent years, that record would have made it better for the
court of appeals judges to have refused en banc rehearing. In so doing they would have
preserved judicial resources. In addition, by lowering the strength of the signal sent by
the disposition, they may even have reduced the likelihood that the Supreme Court
would have granted review.
The urging by some justices that the courts of appeals sit en banc produces an
interesting irony: although en banc rulings had earlier received more favorable
treatment that did dispositions by panels, at the same time thejustices were calling on
the courts of appeals to sit en banc more frequently, their institution, the Supreme
Court, treated en banc dispositions less favorably than rulings from court of appeals
panels. Although some have seen a relationship between the increased number of Ninth
Circuit en banc sittings in the late 1990s and a decline in Supreme Court review of that
court's cases, that derived from a one-term decrease and thus is not particularly
persuasive.

